

Academic Intelligence beyond the Sovereign Consensus: Inter-ethnic Politics of Equality Breaking the Securitisation of Time under National Sovereignty

Mateescu, Dragoş

Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version

Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article

Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:

Mateescu, D. (2012). Academic Intelligence beyond the Sovereign Consensus: Inter-ethnic Politics of Equality Breaking the Securitisation of Time under National Sovereignty. *Annals of the University of Bucharest / Political science series*, 14(1), 33-75. <https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-389687>

Nutzungsbedingungen:

Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY-NC-ND Lizenz (Namensnennung-Nicht-kommerziell-Keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den CC-Lizenzen finden Sie hier:
<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/deed.de>

Terms of use:

This document is made available under a CC BY-NC-ND Licence (Attribution-Non Commercial-NoDerivatives). For more Information see:
<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0>

**ACADEMIC INTELLIGENCE BEYOND THE SOVEREIGN
CONSENSUS: INTER-ETHNIC POLITICS OF EQUALITY
BREAKING THE SECURITISATION OF TIME
UNDER NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY**

DRAGOȘ MATEESCU

Abstract

The present paper analyses the securitisation of time by national sovereignties and the challenges posed to this nationalised time by ethnic minorities in two countries, i.e. Romania and Turkey. The argument builds on an understanding of sovereignty as inseparable from the modern subjectivity discursing it and the spatial and temporal coordinates of this subjectivity. It employs the Heideggerian theorisation of the modern sovereign subjectivity to explain, with an appeal to Derrida, how this subjectivity produces its private temporality in terms of its own present-presence. In the same, Heideggerian tradition of thought, the paper then theorises national sovereignty as an onomastic exercise placing the private temporality of the sovereign subjectivity, its conception of past and future, under the name of the nation. The author elaborates on Giorgio Agamben's view of sovereignty as state of exception and Hans-Georg Gadamer's theory of naming in order to explicate how the national, sovereign subjectivity authors in this way its own realm, its own normality and the exceptions from that normality. This amounts to the production of the consensus of national sovereignty expressed in the *policies* of the modern state. The result, in the account by Jacques Rancière and Erin Manning, excludes *politics* contesting the sovereign consensus, which in an onomastically nationalised political life excludes, in fact, the non-national inside, i.e. the ethnic minorities and their alternative predication of political life. The author illustrates how the production of the nationalised temporality has emerged in Romania and Turkey and also how the most numerous minorities there, Hungarian and Kurdish respectively, have started challenging the consensus of national sovereignty. Since Romania has already become EU Member State and Turkey is currently a candidate to EU membership, the research also sheds a new light on the possibility of post-national politics in Europe under the aegis of the Union.

Keywords: international relations, securitization, temporality, national sovereignties, ethnicity, political life.

Academic intelligence has been historically involved in the making and re-making of our cultural, social, economic, and political life. The academia, i.e. the producer of such intelligence, operates by tradition with already existing theories that provide analytical reference and guidance. The object of analysis approached in this text, however, demands more than that. The chapter

illustrates an instance when the ad hoc elaboration of a theory is crucial for the production of politics-related intelligence.

That is because under scrutiny here are the implications of a novel political discourse of a certain ethnic minority, which challenges the mainstream theory and practice of state sovereignty. Consequently, the issue could be, or become extremely important in domestic and international politics. More specifically, the analysis focuses on the demand of Hungarians in Romania that *sovereignty be shared* between the ethnic majority and minorities in the respective state (Csergo 2007: 37-38).¹ This calls implicitly for a re-constitution of sovereignty as to allow for *equality of status* between all ethnic communities without altering the territorial configuration of Romania and regardless of numeric, that is, quantitative difference.

The issue of equality of status clearly invites then a non-quantitative, i.e. a qualitative understanding of inter-ethnic relations. This practically renders obsolescent the mainstream theory of national sovereignty and of minority rights in relation with the territorially-defined national sovereignty. These notions have been derived from the principle of self-determination, ambiguously formulated by Woodrow Wilson in 1919 (MacMillan 2001: 11-12). According to it, the new sovereign nations in Central and Eastern Europe enjoyed full sovereign rights, while the situation of ethnic minorities was regulated through population exchanges and/or international minority rights guarantees (Jackson Preece 2005: 165-166).

In that context, the principle of sovereignty was understood in the old Wesphalian tradition as *one* nation's absolute internal authority, inviolable from within and without, to rule on a territorially bound state (Bartelson 1995: 31, 41; James 1999: 462; Teschke 2003: 116). But the formula also encoded in fact the dominant position of ethnic majorities in and their interests over particular spaces (Atanasova 2004: 357; Teschke 2003: 245). As a result, in the contemporary nation-states, ethnic majority-minority relations have been inherently relations of power, hence inequality (Barzilai 2005).

Indeed, inter-ethnic inequality is ontologically inherent to the historical constitution of national states on the principle of popular (read "national") sovereignty. The nation-states have excluded ethnic minorities in one way or another in order to exist at all. Under such conditions, the minority, non-dominant ethnic communities have become mere objects of "minority policies" of national states, which have also shaped "inter-national" politics, including the minority rights regime in international law (Kymlicka 2007: 381-382; Jackson Preece 2005: 147; Sasse 2005: 674).

¹ Similar claims were raised by the Albanians in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) in the early 1990s and, more recently, by Kurds in Turkey. Due to lack of editorial space, the author has opted to focus here only on the case of the Hungarians in Romania.

In a political world so much bound to the ontology of sovereign national states, the above-mentioned demand of the Hungarian minority for equality of status and the sharing of sovereign authority in Romania may then make little sense. However, and this is the main hypothesis tested here, the sense of such demands can be grasped if the analysis moves beyond the quantitative understanding of national sovereignty. Political representatives of Hungarians in Romania have explicitly called for the re-making of the respective polity to allow for the equality of status between the ethnic majority and minorities as nations constitutive of the state (Csergo 2007: 37-38). The target of the Hungarian minority militancy may thus be not the principle of sovereignty, but its national content.

The author needs then to build here an analytical mechanism on the assumption, explained and tested below, that such views are better understood if national sovereignty is theorised as securitising both its physical *and* non-physical domains. The notion of securitisation is borrowed from the Copenhagen School in international relations where it has emerged in direct connection with social constructivism. Put simple, the prioritisation of something over any other thing in authoritative discourse means that the respective thing is given exceptional attention requiring exceptional security measures, i.e. is securitised (Buzan *et al.* 1998: 23-25). Securitisation is therefore first and foremost a speech-act and the utterance of security in connection with a thing is thus understood to securitise that particular thing (Wæver 1995: 55).

There is nevertheless much more to the concept than may seem on the face of it. That is because the discourse of securitisation suspends in fact the 'normal' ways of politics, by 'the staging of existential issues in politics to lift them above politics' (Wæver 1995: 46-86; see also Buzan *et al.* 1998: 23-24). The uttering of security is thus capable of moving whatever it refers to beyond the inter-subjective realm of *politics* (Guzzini 2005: 513) into the realm of sovereign consensus over what is a threat.

In my interpretation, the sovereign consensus, which is a theoretical construct, authors its own realm of tangible (f)actuality. And it is with this very authoring of its own (f)actuality that entities within the realm of sovereignty are securitised in accordance with the sovereign discourse of its own secure (read "consensual") political normality. Ethnic minorities are entities that become securitised in the discourse of national sovereignty as anomalies from the national political normality, hence turned into mere objects of specific *policies* of securitisation, i.e. minority policies. The realm of politics is essentially a space of equality of status between antagonistic discourses, while policies are spaces of authority where the equality of status between actors involved is excluded. Thus, the policy subject (the national sovereign) and the policy object (the ethnic minority) are obviously in a relation of power and inequality.

This interpretation allows for theorising majority-minority relations of power and inequality in a more explicit way. Thus, in the modern political context of democracy under national sovereignty (Freeman 2002: 115-116; Jackson Preece 2005: 12-13; Mill 1972: 392-393), minorities have been historically exiled at the periphery of political possibilities in positions of inferiority (Bleiker and Chou 2010: 12). In such positions, minorities became subject to state policies aiming to exclude or/and assimilate them (Jackson Preece 2005: 156, 184-186). Indeed, in the very logic of liberal democracy, ethnic diversity has been interpreted as a threat potentially undermining the nation-state's cohesiveness and stability, thus representing a security problem (Jackson Preece 2005: 4-5; Sasse 2005: 674-675). Subjecting ethnic minorities to specific policies of the sovereign state implied their being suspended from the "normal" politics between equal participating actors.

The Hungarians' demand for inter-ethnic equality of status in Romania already makes more sense then. However, fundamental principles of state sovereignty firmly embedded in domestic and international politics would pose resistance. That is primarily due to our political imagination being blocked in the mainstream conception of sovereignty that sees it exclusively in relation with its constituted, physical and hence only quantitatively explicable domains: territory, physical bodies, and so on. Obligated by the main hypothesis advanced above, I propose to test a theorisation of sovereignty as phenomenon occurring both in space and in time, elaborated upon in the next section. This will facilitate a better understanding of (1) the possibility of and (2) the ways to facilitate a politics of inter-ethnic equality under state sovereignty, which would in turn contribute to state stability. The path adopted here toward such a theorisation is the phenomenological one, which the next section clarifies.

The Consensus of Sovereignty and the Nationalisation of Time: Methodological Considerations

The prioritisation of territoriality in theorising sovereignty means that quantitative aspects of its application are highlighted, but the qualitative ones remain obscured. However, sovereignty cannot be understood in isolation from the subjectivity discoursing it and from the spatial *and* temporal dimensions of that subjectivity. Heidegger (1962: 458; see also Odysseos 2007: xxiv, 97, 138) described the modern self as sovereign, sufficient, indivisible and apt to master nature. This modern subject has instituted its sovereign authority over its own possibilities of life (Odysseos 2010: 21) with a claim to unity effacing multiplicity (Bleiker and Chou 2010: 12-13; Odysseos 2007: 7). It therefore resembles the state's indivisibility in deciding sovereignly over its political condition. Indeed, the concept describes eventually *any* autonomous and self-

sufficient subject having ultimate authority of decision over its possibilities of being (Bartelson 1995: 2, 24).

Agamben theorised sovereignty in this sense as authoring of the political system. The very language of the sovereign law of constitution indicates a demiurgic act of a subjectivity endowed with constitutive authority (*auctoritas*) that creates, legitimates and guarantees the whole political life (Agamben 2005: 82; Borislavov 2005). This legal discourse constitutes and perpetuates the state form and, with it, a particular form of political life whose territoriality serves *à posteriori* for the spatial positioning (Aron 1966: 182; Bartelson 1995: 31) of the constitutive act. It is the language of constitutional discourse producing a particular state, therefore, rather than physicalities such as territory that ontologises in physical factuality, i.e. (f)actualises the constitutive power and its domains. And that presupposes the discursive engineering by the constitutive subjectivity of its own presence in the temporality of human life.

Indeed, in the phenomenological understanding of things, 'Being that can be understood is language' (Gadamer 1998: 474; see also Heidegger, 1962: 203-204). And sovereignty is ontologically bound to speech through the subjectivity speaking sovereignly. Language is in fact 'the sovereign who [...] declares that there is nothing outside [itself]' (Agamben 1998: 21). But a subjectivity also authors through speech its own (f)actual presence, i.e. it makes itself present by authoring its own temporal present, its own 'now' (Heidegger 1962: 458). Individual or collective, a sovereign subjectivity institutes its unitary wholeness as (f)act of life in a temporal dimension, its nowness.

Derrida elaborated on the Heideggerian notion of presence with ontological foundation in nowness (Heidegger 1962: 47-48; Derrida 1981: 5-6; 2003: 19) and theorised it as both (f)actual *and* temporal category, i.e. present-presence. This in turn signals a speaking subjectivity instituting its particular, full and private temporality (Ungureanu 2008: 304-305) discoursed from the now-situation of the sovereign speaker (Derrida 1982: 34). The discourse of sovereignty – otherwise a purely theoretical construct (Krasner 1999; Wendt 1992: 412-415) – engineers in this way its own *particular* political form with a particular temporal presence defined by sovereign consensus (Rancière 1999).

Such consensus ontologically excludes alternative, multicultural forms in order to be at all (Bleiker and Chou 2010: 12-13; Odysseos 2007: 7; Rancière 1999: 78). In national form, the sovereign consensus authors political possibilities by nationalising political time (Manning 2004: 62-63). It thus narrows options even more by reducing the always multicultural human life to the particular political newness that is nationalised under the name of the nation. This illustrates a 'most radical individuation' through language (Heidegger 1962: 62) made possible in political modernity. It condemns minorities to political life dominated by the dominant present-presence of the titular ethnicity, which sovereignly constitutes the state as space *and* time of inter-ethnic inequality.

The modern “national” state acting as physical embodiment of national sovereignty means the institution of the nation’s presence as condition of political possibilities. The imagined community turns in this way into a (f)act of life where it conditions not only a ‘politics of presence’ (Phillips 1995), but political ontology itself. In law, it institutes what is here called the *objective presence* of the nation, whose *historical presence* is also engineered in the discourse of national history.

Indeed, with the encoding of such particularity in the language of constitutional law, the imagined national community (Anderson 2006) becomes an objective presence (f)actualised with the juridical category of citizenship and speaking the state’s official language. As part of this objective presence, the citizen is not anymore a mere member of a political community apt to develop rich possibilities of multicultural life. It is a citizen whose political relevance is conditioned by conformity with the ethnicised identity and the official language of the nationalised sovereignty. Political life itself is thus ethnicised through subordination to the name and language of the dominant ethnic group defining the political in its own national terms from the seat of sovereign *auctoritas*, its language being principle of order (Anderson 2006: 68).

Central in the process remains however the act of naming, i.e. the onomastic act. Indeed, if language is intimate to the ontologisation of sovereignty, then everything defined as political by the sovereign consensus becomes so with ‘being named’ in the language of sovereignty (Agamben 1998: 21). The nation’s name is the very name of the sovereign who institutes the consensus over what is and what is not political (Rancière 1999: 29) by declaring what is and what is not national. Two purely theoretical constructs, nation and sovereignty, are hence (f)actualised in one, monocultural objective presence through constitutional law. This declares the nation’s name and its language to be the nation-state’s principles of ontologisation in the always multicultural (f)actuality of human life. The analytical point of focus in the analysis below is therefore not the ideology of Romanian nationalism, but the nationalist discourse constitutive of the Romanian state at different stages in its historical becoming from the nineteenth century until nowadays.

The state-constitutive Romanian nationalism will therefore be interpreted as discourse of sovereignty subordinating all political-cultural possibilities to the nominal nation’s ethno-citizenship and language. In ontologising its sovereign ethno-self, this national sovereignty discourse has exiled non-Romanian identities at the periphery of nationalised politics (Bleiker and Chou 2010: 12; Panayi 2000: 215). The next sections will explicate the self-institution of the Romanian sovereign subjectivity discoursing national sovereignty. The analysis will trace the production of the nation’s objective presence in legislation on citizenship and the official language along all important periods in the history of Romanian sovereignty, from 1859 until nowadays. This will be accompanied by

a scrutiny of the most often employed themes in the official versions of “national” history, which subordinate all temporality to the timeline of the nation’s becoming. Such themes will be identified particularly in the curricula of history teaching. This field of education has been identified as central, ever since the nineteenth century, in the national pedagogies engineering homogenous national identities (Smith 2000: 10; Weber 1976: 95, 333-334).

The Hungarian political discourse demanding inter-ethnic equality of status will therefore be interpreted as breaking the Westphalian logic behind the superior status of titular, sovereign Romanian majority. At stake is therefore more than the issue of respect for all cultural identities by an already constituted sovereignty. It is a demand that sovereignty itself is reconstituted anew with a denationalised content allowing for the political ontologisation of the non-national, so that a time of politics of multiculturalism can emerge (Manning 2004: 62-64).

The Romantic Age of the Romanian Sovereign Self

Engineering the Romanian national sovereignty meant the production by local elites of a national tradition of homogenous unity (Smith 1999: 150). However, this also presupposed ascribing to the imagined national community a temporal continuity along past, present, and future (Giddens 1990: 37). Interpreted from the methodological perspective explained in the previous section, it all amounted to the securitisation of political time by colonising it with the imagined historical and objective presence of the Romanian ethnicity. Under these conditions, ethnic minorities have been gradually exiled at the periphery of political possibilities, subjected to the minority policies designed by the national sovereignty.

The discourse of a Romanian sovereign self debuted sometime in the eighteenth century in a context when Romanian-speaking people were under domination from three different sovereign powers: the Habsburgs in Transylvania, the Ottomans in Walachia and western Moldova, and the Tsarist Empire in eastern Moldova.² The idea of political independence was therefore logically accompanied by a nascent project of gradually eliminating the usually more prosperous foreigners and replacing them with a class of Romanians whose political identity an independent Romanian state had the duty to produce (Livezeanu 1995: 19; Lovinescu 1972: 305). The engineering of this collective political subjectivity built on the Romanian nationalism in Transylvania, born in

² The part of Moldova situated west of the Prut River will unite with the Principality of Walachia in 1859 to form the first independent Romanian state and continues to be part of modern Romania. The region of Moldova east of the Prut River was under Russian control and passed briefly under Romanian sovereignty between the two World Wars. It was re-annexed by the Soviet Union in 1944 and became the independent Republic of Moldova in 1991.

relation of enmity with the Hungarian other, and which later influenced the conception of national identity in Walachia and Moldova (Bădăraș 1987: 132).

The intellectual efforts of the Romanian elites were inspired by French, Italian and German experiences in nation building and focused on the search for the nation's illustrious, ancient roots. This meant reference to the period of Roman rule in Dacia following Trajan's victory against Dacian king Decebal. The subsequent annexation of this province to the empire inaugurated more than five generations (106-275 AD) of direct Dacian-Roman ethno-linguistic synthesis under Roman law (Boia 2001: Chapter 3; Iordachi and Trencsényi 2003: 420; McMahon 2009; Quinney 2007; Romocea 2004: 162). In the interpretation by early nationalist historians, the modern Romanian people were direct descendants of the ancient Romans, evidenced by their Romance language.

This early nationalist literature has generally tended then to place that ancient history of Dacia in antithesis with the Romanians' condition of servitude in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The brief unification of all principalities inhabited by Romanians under Michael the Brave in 1599 served in this context to indicate the historical inclination of this people toward political union, which legitimised contemporary projects of reunification (Boia 2001: 46-50; Livezeanu 1995: 130; Mitu 2001: 109-117). Dacia became inevitably the Romanian 'ethnoscape' (Smith 1999: 150) in nationalist literature building on the *continuity* of Latin cultural identity in this mythical space, with language as organic bond of Romanianhood. The theme was to play a central role, indeed, in the propaganda preparing the way to the unification of Walachia with Moldova in 1859, and with Transylvania in 1918 (Boia 2001: 113-114; Iordachi and Trencsényi 2003: 427, 432; Mitu 2001: 24; Quinney 2007: 446).

Indeed, the location of most Dacian-Roman sites in Transylvania made this region quintessential for the predication of a Romanian continuous *historical presence* and thus legitimately entitled to sovereign self-determination. We shall see in what follows that the gradual securitisation through nationalisation of political temporality in preparation of and especially under Romanian sovereignty de-legitimised alternative, minority conceptions of political time. This in turn strengthened the claim of the majority to *objective presence*, (f)actualised after 1859 in the legal formulation of the nation's political identity in terms of citizenship and official language. Central in the process has been the ethnicisation of the very "Romanian" name of the people (archaic *rumân*, or modern *român*), which originally had a profound social connotation as it denominated the majority peasant serfs in Walachia and Moldova at least since the sixteenth century (Giurescu 2008: 31, 57-58). The word *Romania* itself had been in use until early modern times to indicate not the territory of the modern state, but the Latin Empire of Constantinople from the thirteenth century (Wolff 1948).

The ethnicisation of this name begun in connection with the intense efforts of local linguists, especially in the nineteenth century, toward enriching the Romance character of the national tongue with neologisms from French and Italian (Ahonen 2007: 23; Quinney 2007: 446). The Romanian language was to represent a crucial element in the (f)actualisation of the imagined community. Nationalist literati interpreted it as indicating the nation's historical continuity and, in effect, its present-presence (Derrida 1982: 34; 1997: 66-67; Ungureanu 2008: 304-305) in the region long before the arrival of other ethnic communities, such as the Hungarians, Slavs, or Ottoman Turks whose domination was therefore illegitimate and hence *temporary*.

The emerging national historiography was thus stridently insisting on the Romanians' continuity and 'temporal priority' over ethnic others (Verdery 1991: 175). In popular literature propagating this construct, the Slavic, Turkic and Ugric (Hungarian) people were invariably placed sometime *after* the Romanians. Topographic details already bearing Romanian names, contemporary minorities had therefore only the right to be guests in lands already colonised by national onomastics. The language of national toponomastics thus acted in this context as the imagined community's principle of order (Anderson 2006: 68) (f)actualising a particular, nationalised political ontology.

Consequently, the centuries-long domination of the Angevin Hungary and the Habsburgs in Transylvania, or that of the Ottoman and Russian Empires in Moldova and Wallachia have been interpreted in the modern discourse of Romanian political identity as mere periods of interruption in the historical line of Romanian continuity of Latin stock (Boia 2001: 113-114; Câmpeanu 1991: 820; Hitchins 1964: 670). The survival of the Romance language in the region was erroneously considered sufficient evidence attesting this continuity (Chen 2003: note 65; Quinney 2007: 445-447). However, linguistic identity also served in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as instrument in the construction of a political identity inclined toward Western values, that Romanians were historically destined to guard from Oriental alterity (Lovinescu 1972: 67; Mitu 2001: 30-33; 197-198; Spiridon 2006: 377; Tănăsioiu 2005: 120). The result gradually taking shape in that period was the production of a national sovereign subjectivity building its own existence on the discursive elimination of "Oriental" ethnic others from a "self-Westernising" national ethno-space.

The name of the nation became gradually central in the process. After its brief use in the thirteenth century to denominate the Latin Empire of Constantinople (Wolff 1948: 9, 13), the term 'Romania' reappeared in the nineteenth century in some minor, foreign works on the region's geography (Boia 2001: 34). The terms *rumân* and *rumânie*, already in use for centuries in Walachia and Moldova referring to the rural serfs and their condition (Brezeanu 1999: 229-232; Giurescu 2008: 57-58; 119-146), became powerful ethno-political onomastics.

Ethnically non-Romanian “others” were always impersonated in such discourse by different people depending on the region where this Romanian nationalism became manifest. Thus, while the Hungarians were assigned the role in Transylvania, in Moldova and Walachia “the other” was Slavic and/or Ottoman and/or Jewish. Nevertheless, abundant reference in popular literature placed them all in the larger, indefinite category of non-Latin, Oriental alterity, which allowed Romanians to portray themselves as Latin, hence belonging naturally to the Western European family of values (Atanasova 2004: 367; Mitu 2001: 128-132; Quinney 2007). This discourse was embraced by the 1848 generation, which was to become decisive in the emergence of the first Romanian sovereignty through the union of Walachia and Moldova in 1859.

The 1848 revolutionary movement was led ideologically by a generation of intellectuals including Mihail Kogălniceanu, Constantin A. Rosetti, Ion C. Brătianu, August T. Laurian and Nicolae Bălcescu. These men were active as literary authors, publicists, historians, politicians and pioneers of the national education system. Kogălniceanu from Moldova and Bălcescu from Walachia, together with representatives of the late Transylvanian Enlightenment, were especially effective in promoting at the centre of the education philosophy the idea of national emancipation with profound xenophobic connotations (Boia 2001: 50; Iordache 1997: 5; Spiridon 2009: 153). As indicated above, the logic underlining this idea was that once subjection to Oriental foreigners ended, the nation would continue its normal historical flux as European people. The congruence between normality and Latin continuity constituted the cornerstone of this construct (Boia 2001: 50).

Popular literature of the early and mid-nineteenth century was thus propagating a conception of the imagined national community whose members were necessarily born in Romanian lands and defined themselves ethno-linguistically as Romanians. Other ethnicities – Jews, Gypsies, Greeks, Tatars, Turks, Russians and Ukrainians still dwelling in Moldova and Walachia – were tacitly excluded from literary definitions of the Romanian nation, hence from the human domain potentially legitimating a future Romanian sovereignty (Boatcă 2006: 556; Iordachi 2001: 159; Mateescu 2008: 294-295; Rogobete 2004: 287). The public of the time was already consuming a significant volume of literature insisting on the continuity of presence and unitary character of the Romanian nation. Scientific quality was not among priorities. The anthological exaggerations of the Transylvanian School of Enlightenment, in particular those authored by the Șincai-Maior-Klein triad, influenced nationalist historiography in Moldova and Walachia, too (Boia 2001: 131; Mitu 2001: 183). For instance, Gheorghe Șincai, writing in 1811 Transylvania, entrusted his readers that even the Bulgarian Tsardoms were in fact supported by the numerous Romanians from the southern bank of the Danube ten centuries after the evacuation of Moesia by the Romans (Boia 2001: 114-115).

Petru Maior, friend of Șincai and like him much influenced by German Romanticism (Gledhill 2005: 360), produced one year later an influential work aiming to totally Latinise the nation's origins and claiming to this end that the Romans had exterminated all Dacians (Boia 2001: 86; Hitchins 2000: 25). Șincai and Maior, together with Samuel Klein, also inaugurated a trend in Romanian historiography insisting on the Latin purity of Romanian language. Since it was a tongue of such 'primordial purity' (Mitu 2001: 233), Romanian thus not only predated and differed from, but was also axiologically superior to Hungarian. Klein even created a system of transcription exaggerating etymological closeness between Romanian and Latin that he and Șincai employed in editing their *Elementa Linguae Daco-Romanae* in 1780 and influencing similar exaggerations in Moldova and Walachia (Hitchins 1964: 671-672).

Such views also penetrated textbooks. Around three hundred village-schools in Romanian language appeared in Transylvania after a 1781 edict of the Habsburgs. Under Șincai's personal guidance, these schools were to propagate Romanian nationalist propaganda despite certain countermeasures taken by the authorities (Bărbulescu *et al.* 1998: 296; Hitchins 1964: 664-666; Mârza 2010: 82). The works of popular poet Budai-Deleanu, 'charged with ethno-cultural and political meanings' under Herderian influences, were promoted in this context (*ibid.*: 88). The nationalist works by Petru Maior were also included in the curriculum. They built on the above-mentioned idea of the Romans exterminating the Dacians and not marrying 'barbarian' Dacian women. In Maior's view, Romanians also kept this habit, unlike the migratory Hungarians who came 'from the East' without women and thus had to mix their blood with local Slavs and Greeks. In this racial logic, pupils were taught that Romanians were then superior to Hungarians due to their older and purer roots (Hitchins 1964: 662, 664).

Such discursive strategies soon crossed the Carpathians with the Saint Sava Academy in Bucharest and the Mihăilean Academy in Iași adopting the nationalist teachings of the Transylvanian School and preparing the way for the future national education system. This in turn created the conditions for the intellectual emancipation of Romanian elites that made possible a Romanian 1848, the establishment of the first Romanian state in 1859 and its independence in 1877 (Bădăraș 1987: 10-11; 164-165; Bochmann 2010: 107; Mitu 2001: 64). It was also in this context that Kogălniceanu imposed his understanding of national history at the Mihăilean Academy (Bădăraș 1987: 103-105). Its principles were transferred after 1860 at the University of Iași, while a similar transfer was made from Saint Sava Academy to the University of Bucharest in 1864.

At that time, the concept of history itself was unclear among Romanian intellectuals. Educated under the influence of Herder's understanding of the nation (Escudier 2010: 73; Spiridon 2009: 153), Kogălniceanu explained his theory of national history at the Mihăilean Academy in 1843. This is considered nowadays as having inaugurated the Romanticist school of Romanian

historiography aiming to educate patriotic citizens with ‘national breath’. The respective discourse was also important because Kogălniceanu praised Michael the Brave, who had united Walachia, Moldova and Transylvania in 1599, thus presenting the emerging academia with a hero and a political ideal (Bădăraș 1987: 106-107; Boia 2001: 41). The fragment below (Kogălniceanu 1967: 107, my translation; for another English version, see Mitu 2001: 186) confirms the centrality of historical science in Kogălniceanu’s view of Romanian ethno-political ontology:

We are in urgent need for a history of our country, even if only for the defence of our rights against the foreign nations. While we still lack a history, any foreign enemy will feel he has a right to come and say [...]: “The beginning of your people is unknown, the name you bare is not yours, nor the land you inhabit [...] forget your origins, rid your name, or take the name I will give you, pack up your things and leave the land you live on, for it is not yours [...].”

The quotation indicates clearly the fundamental role played by national onomastics and the production of a national version of history in the (f)actualisation of the imagined community. The nation’s political ontology was thus built on a discourse of national sovereignty inseparable from the subjectivity speaking sovereignly in the name of the nation, and the spatial *and* temporal coordinates of that subjectivity. These ideas became leitmotif of the patriotic intellectuals actively involved in the revolutionary movement of 1848 in Moldova and Walachia and announced the ‘vernacular mobilisation’ toward the engineering of the ethnic nation (Smith 2000: 72) in the independent Romania after 1877.

In practice, this mobilisation started with the intensive ‘ethnisation of Romanian linguistic conscience’ in the footsteps of the Transylvanian School (Escudier 2010: 73). Soon after 1848, Bălcescu published a book titled *History of Romanians under Voivode Michael the Brave* arguing for the national unification as ‘the dearest dream of the great Romanian voivodes’. This was the first treatise in which ‘the medieval history of the Romanians, of the three Romanian lands, was explicitly treated as *national* history’ (Boia 2001: 41-42; original emphasis). A systematic affirmation of a Romanian historical presence and the colonisation of political time with national onomastics can then be said to have effectively started with the works by Kogălniceanu and Bălcescu in the mid-eighteenth century.

The political effects of this predication of time were to become evident once Kogălniceanu became not only the undisputed ideological leader of the self-determination movement, but also the first prominent politician in united Romania after 1859. His commitment to the national cause was beyond any doubt as he even continued to give national history courses without payment at the Academy in Iași and also initiated in 1840 a nationalist literary movement with the short-lived but influential *Dacia Literară* (Bădăraș 1987: 106;

Gledhill 2005: 363). As Prime Minister and Member of Parliament after 1859, Kogălniceanu's conception of national sovereignty was to be decisive in the formulation of citizenship and education policies, hence on the production of the nation's objective presence. And it will be this ethno-presence that will condition political possibilities and inter-ethnic relations under Romanian sovereignty for the generations to come.

Glimpses of a unitary national education system in vernacular Romanian had already emerged in Moldova and Walachia under the Organic Regulations (Bădăraș 1987: 58-59, 61-63). Courses of history and geography were particularly designed to Romanianise time and space, while insisting on an ethnic definition of the nation in terms of blood ties (Murgescu 2001: 268-269). The theme of the Romanian nation being 'the most ancient' in its fatherland (Mitu 2001: 221), originating in the Transylvanian School, was omnipresent in the curriculum. During the years toward the 1859 union of Moldova and Walachia, the society was also becoming increasingly xenophobic, public abhorrence of mixed marriages (McMahon 2009: 105) being accompanied by political discourses targeting the Jews as threats to the nascent Romanian middle class (Feldman 1979: 53). Such conditions facilitated the birth, after 1859, of a constitutional discourse overtly against the rich Jewish minority.

The union of Walachia and Moldova in 1859 marked the birth of the first sovereign Romanian state, officially named United Principalities and legalised later with the 1866 Constitution under the foreign Prince Carol I Hohenzollern. By that time, a policy of 'bureaucratic nationalism' (Iordachi 2001: 163) had already produced a national administration supporting the Romanian Orthodox Church and the local businesses against foreign elements (Iordachi and Trencsényi 2003: 425-426; Korkut 2006: 137; Stan and Turcescu 2007: 18-21). The very coming of Carol I on the throne was insistently motivated by prominent Liberal Party politician I.C. Brătianu as European solution to Romanians' centennial servitude to Oriental enemies (Iordache 1997: 27-29). Creating a national identity built therefore on xenophobia with roots deep in regional history.

The process leading to the legal formulation of a Romanian citizenship in 1866 was also circumscribed to this general context in which Romanianhood was stridently associated with Western values, while non-Romanians were exiled somewhere on the Oriental side of mental maps (Bărbulescu *et al.* 1998: 384ff; Iordachi 2001: 159). The dominant discourse regarding these issues was conservative rather than liberal, despite of being reputedly inspired by the French and Belgian constitutions of the time (Boia 2001: 90-91; Gallagher 2008: 22; Iijima 2010: 312-315; Iordache 1997: 57; Iordachi 2001: 159-161). Its targets were especially the Greek Ottomans and the Jews who were economically dominant before 1859 (Korkut 2006: 133; Leuştean 2007: 730; Livezeanu 1995: 4).

Iordachi has documented that the discourse of citizenship and national sovereignty around the 1866 Constitution prioritised the principle of *jus*

sanguinis defining the political community in the ethno-language of blood ties between members (2001: 164). Indeed, the first and third articles of the charter proclaimed the nation as unitary and indivisible while ‘colonisation’, i.e. land ownership by foreigners was explicitly forbidden (Romanian Constitution 1866). As to leave no room for a civic understanding of the nation, which would have benefited the Greek Ottomans and the Jews, the Constitution also conflated citizenship with Romanian ethno-identity under the notion of ‘Romanianhood’ and ethnic minorities were not mentioned at all. The words for “citizen” (*cetățean*) and “citizenship” (*cetățenie*) cannot be found anywhere in the text. Instead, all ethnically non-Romanian inhabitants were named ‘aliens’ (*streini*), of whom only Christians were declared eligible for Romanianhood, i.e. citizenship (Romanian Constitution 1866: Title II). Article 82 also demanded that the heirs of Catholic German Prince Carol I convert to Romanian Orthodox Christianity, thus placing national onomastics in tandem with the dominant religious denomination at the top of hierarchies and denying political rights to non-Christians (see also Iordache 1997: 193; Korkut 2006: note 44; Leuștean 2007: 718).

The establishment of the first Romanian sovereignty turned in this way the word *rumân* from a notion with social connotations and indicating at best an “imagined community” into ethno-onomastics of a political community. With the 1866 Constitution, this ethno-name clearly became a principle of the nation’s (f)actualisation as objective presence, which in itself excluded all not fitting its sanguine definition. The consequences for non-Romanians were palpably objective, too, as the Jews in particular became a target of economic discrimination after many of them run away from the oppressive Habsburg policies in Galicia to the new Romanian state (Feldman 1979: 53). Kogălniceanu’s view set the dominant discourse in this context yet again. A pragmatic politician, he supported religious rights being granted to minorities but had insisted in the Moldovan Assembly as early as 1857 that political rights be reserved to Christians only for ‘consolidating the Romanian nationality’ through the ‘rejection of differences’ (Kogălniceanu 1967: 208).

The anti-Jewish constitutional article 7 was to be eliminated later following pressure from European powers (Iijima 2010: 314; Ioanid 2004: 424; Iordachi 2001: 169-170). Nevertheless, it indicated the xenophobia implicit in the dominant political discourse of the time aiming to exclude ethnic others from the nation as community of prosperity (Gallagher 2008: 21-22). The state eventually granted citizenship rights to the Jews but on individual basis and only around 2000 of them enjoyed this status after 1878 (Ioanid 2004: 424; Turda 2008: 443-444). The property policy of the United Principalities after gaining independence will confirm the perpetuation of anti-minorities political attitudes.

Following the declaration of independence from Ottomans on 9 May 1877 (Kogălniceanu 1967: 315), the United Principalities fought on the Russian side against the Porte. Victory in the 1877-1878 war and support from the international

community led to the country's becoming the sovereign Kingdom of Romania (*Old Kingdom*) in 1881, with Carol I as crowned head of state. The territory was also enlarged with the annexation of Dobrogea. In the new configuration, Romanians represented a solid majority of 92 per cent out of the Kingdom's total population of almost six million (Bărbulescu *et al.* 1998: 384-389, 400; Gallagher 2008: 22-23). Turks and Tatars had been dominant for centuries in Dobrogea where they represented approximately 30 per cent of the population and owned around 50 per cent of the land. Intensive colonisation with ethnic Romanians and aggressive land property policies under an 1882 law following the 1866 constitutional provisions on citizenship led to the ethnic majority reaching 63 per cent in land ownership by 1905 (Iordachi 2001: 172-175).³

The legislation on national citizenship was therefore, indeed, a dynamic concept of political design with practical value and effective agency of social change (Sommers 1993). From the methodological perspective adopted here, this meant the discursive production of a Romanian objective presence with doubly determining the political ontology: it instituted the (f)actuality of the imagined community, while concomitantly excluding ethnic others from that (f)actuality. The institution of the nation's *historical presence* completed the ethnicisation of political time.

Analyses of political discourses in public schools between 1831 and 1877 suggest the imposition of particular ideal type of Romanian individuality. This was a 'good' Christian, preferably a peasant symbolising the ethnic purity of rural life by comparison with the urban mosaic (Mincu 2009: 58; Murgescu 1999: 43). The rural space thus became an idyllic 'ethnoscape' (Smith 1999: 150) of a people depicted in educational literature as a 'linguistically and ethnically organic community' (Mincu 2009: 59). Such literature implicitly discouraged then a public sense of the multicultural social (f)actuality, whose political temporality became gradually dominated by the ethnic majority.

To this end, the public education system developed relatively fast curricula predicated the nation's objective and historical presence in relation of reciprocal legitimisation. The already ethnicised political nowness was obviously the locus of the sovereign subjectivity authoring the dominant discourse in this context. For instance, a reading book for elementary schools published in 1871 Romanianised all history of all people in the country based on the sole evidence that majority were speaking Romanian in 1871. The textbook contained no chapter or section informing students about ethnic minorities. Instead, it taught that a "true Romanian" was only one born from Romanian parents, speaking Romanian language and sharing with brethren the same customs and religion. Additionally, a "Romanian" vowed to fight aliens

³ Eminov (2000: 133) prefers less certainty concerning data due to the unreliability of sources.

living *in* the country, a view also shared by the members of the national agency responsible for the respective curriculum (Murgescu 2001: 270-271).

The early Romanian public instruction thus narrowed considerably the public conception of political possibilities. The society grew during that age with an idea of political normality in which religiously non-Christian Orthodox and ethnically non-Romanian people could/should not enjoy equal political status with the “true” Romanians. And the high level of illiteracy (Gallagher 2008: 23-24; Livezeanu 1995: 30-31) meant that such overtly xenophobic views would easily penetrate deep in the society especially after the efficiency of the public instruction increased with the Haret reforms (Iordachi 2001: 181-182; Livezeanu 1995: 30-33). This may have been in fact an important factor making possible the profoundly anti-Semitic “patriotism” of the fascist regime in Romania a few decades later. And, in a political and cultural context dominated by Kogălniceanu (1967: 241) proclaiming the peasantry ‘the foundation of our nationality’, the village was soon to become the source and end of societal ethno-patriotism from which even the communists would draw ideological energy later.

Toward the twentieth century, a growing historiography was focusing on Transylvania as Romania’s ancient ethnoscape. Xenopol, an overtly anti-Semitic academic (Brustein and Ronnkvist 2002: 222), published the first complete history of the Romanians in six volumes between 1888 and 1893. This popularised the thesis that the Carpathians were the nation’s natural fortress enclosing the cradle of Dacian-Roman symbiosis and Latin continuity, i.e. the Transylvanian plain (Boia 2001: 116). Synchronised with this theme was the insistence in much of the relevant literature of the time on the Asian origins of the Hungarians and on their invasion of Transylvania *much after* the Roman rule in the province.

This Romanticist nationalism imitating Western originals took an autochthonous turn under the influence of the *Junimea* (Youth) cultural movement initiated by Titu Maiorescu. *Junimea* represented a strong intellectual reaction to the excessive imports from Western (especially French) cultures invading Romanian public discourse as ‘forms without content’ and encouraged instead the search for ‘national originality’ in literature (Maiorescu 1966: 395; see also Bărbulescu *et al.* 1998: 391; Mitu 2001: 96-97). History writing was a central target of Junimist criticism for excessive patriotic pathos and lack of attention to method (Boia 2001: 58; Lovinescu 1972: 292; Maiorescu 1966: 402). However, xenophobia was at the heart of this discourse, too, its claimed autochthonism signalling an inward oriented speaking subjectivity.

Benefiting from authoritative voices, among them national poet Eminescu, historians Xenopol and Iorga, philosophers Conta and Rădulescu-Motru, popular writers Hașdeu and Creangă and playwright Caragiale, the Junimist conservative autochthonism dominated political culture in the beginning of the twentieth century (Heinen 2010: 455-469; Mitu 2001: 97-103). With Maiorescu serving as Foreign and Prime Minister between 1910 and 1914, the

administration operated with a unitary, ethnic conception of the nation, of its history and its form of government. And this was the dominant view of politics toward the union with Transylvania in 1918. Despite alternative perspectives being also popular at the time (Boatcă 2006: 563-564), the autochthonist camp managed to impose in public conscience its disliking of the European-oriented “romantic” patriotism of 1848, with strong French influences, and promoted instead a self-centred nationalism of German inspiration.

Europeanism and nationalist autochthonism were to remain the two major options of the Romanian society and were reflected in domestic politics for the next generations (Bochmann 2010: 122; Boia 2001: 59; Gallagher 2008: 26). The perpetuation of this cultural dichotomy was aided by the emergence and then survival of authoritarianism in various forms, from King Carol II and Marshal Antonescu after 1938 until the first democratic change in 1996. The next sections will therefore insist not on the causes and conditions that facilitated authoritarian regimes in Romania, but on their contributions to the perpetuation of state nationalism, which deepened inter-ethnic inequality of status.

The Authoritarian Age of the Romanian Sovereign Self

The diplomatic jousts in Paris at the end of the First World War allowed for the proliferation of nation-states in Eastern Europe, the Greater Romania being also established with Transylvania, Bessarabia and Bukovina attached to the Romanian Kingdom in 1920 (Bărbulescu *et al.* 1998: 418-421; Gallagher 2008: 28-29). This unification also meant that a significant number of foreign ethnic groups entered the human domain of Romanian sovereignty. In the “Old Kingdom”, ethnic minorities (mostly Jews, Roma, Tatars and Turks) had amounted to less than eight per cent of the total population while around 30 per cent were ethnically non-Romanian in 1920 (Bărbulescu *et al.* 1998: 420; Gallagher 2008: 23; Hitchins 1992: 169-170). Hungarians formed the largest minority with almost eight per cent of Romania’s 13 million citizens and a concentration of almost 30 per cent in Transylvania. Around 20 per cent of the entire population was made of other minorities, including Germans, Ukrainians, Russians, Bulgarians, Roma, Jews and others (Gallagher 2008: 29; Korkut 2006: 133; Livezeanu 1995: 9-10). In this multicultural context, the central authorities in Bucharest continued to impose the objective and historical presence of the ethnic majority conditioning political life with the 1923 Constitution expanding the principles established in 1866 (Iijyma 2010: 312, 314).

Despite certain positive provisions addressing ethnic minorities, the 1923 charter predicated them exclusively in terms of rights, i.e. as objects of the minority policies of the ethno-national sovereignty. It affirmed the unitary, indivisible and centralised character of the state, which was to be reflected, for

instance, in legislative acts nationalising the education system (Livezeanu 1998: 23). Moreover, the nation's objective presence was subtly ethnicised. On the surface the charter promoted an apparently civic understanding of Romanian citizenship by granting freedom of conscience (Article 5), civil rights and equality before the law (Articles 7 and 8), the right to association (Articles 28 and 29) and the right to serve in the armed forces (Article 19) regardless of ethnic, linguistic or religious belonging (Romanian Constitution 1923). However, this effacing of cultural differences being operated in (f)actual life by the ethnic majority inevitably strengthened the 'ethnic Romanian character of the new state' (Gallagher 2008: 30).

Despite containing, unlike the 1866 charter, the words 'citizen' (*cetățean*) and 'citizenship' (*cetățenie*), the 1923 Constitution did not define Romanian citizenship. The word "Romanian" appears both in adjectival and substantive form and is used to name all citizens irrespective of (f)actual ethnic identities, thus confirming their subordination to the ethno-political definition of the state. Article 126 also imposed Romanian as sole official language. Consequently, non-Romanians remained protected only in articles explicitly referring to individual rights and not as separate ethno-cultural communities (Iijima 2010: 314). In this sense, the Constitution did reflect to some extent the provisions of the 1919 Minority Treaties under the League of Nations and promised certain political rights (Iordachi 2001: 183). It also facilitated the granting of citizenship to the nearly 770,000 Jews already inhabiting the Old Kingdom (Brunstein and Ronnkvist 2002: 212-213).

However, the protection of minority communities was insured only with reference to relevant international treaties and reflected their weaknesses (Freeman 2002: 30-33, 114; Jackson Preece 2005: 13, 155, 166). And, as seen above, the domestic political elites were already guided by the imperative of elevating a common political identity that overwhelmed other ethnicities with its apparent civic form but an ethno-logic of national sovereignty in content. This was also confirmed with the Romanian Orthodox Church being granted the dominant position in the religious order under state protection (Leuștean 2007: 728). Additionally, the 1921 Land Reform, aiming primarily at reducing the Bolshevik control in Bessarabia (Gallagher 2008: 30), was also to affect the ethnic minorities by allowing for the confiscation of land from small and medium-size properties, minority schools and religious establishments (Illyés 1982: 90).

The 1925 Public Administration Act introduced an oath of allegiance to Romanian sovereignty for all job applications in the public sector, including education, which led to many Romanians replacing Hungarians in Transylvanian administration. The implementation of specific provisions in that act also produced a new administrative organisation of the country, which diminished the role played by local minority communities (Culic 2006: 176-177; Illyés 1982: 91-92). Despite formally granting legal equality to all ethnic groups, the

1923 Constitution was also far from helpful in solving the older Jewish problem of citizenship in Bessarabia where 80,000 Jews remained not registered as Romanian citizens with property rights in 1928 (Brustein and Ronnkvist 2002: 213; Livezeanu 1995: 123).

The considerable enlargement of Romanian territory after 1920 made the administration fear especially Russian and Hungarian irredentism; an intensive policy of Romanianisation was therefore implemented in the newly acquired provinces (Brustein and Ronnkvist 2002: 223). This was accompanied by a renewed state activism promoting the economic interests of ethnic Romanians in continuation of pre-1923 practices. Successive governments implemented protectionist economic policies aiming to eliminate the foreign capital and enhance the Romanian control of infrastructure and of the main industries against foreigners from within and without (Bărbulescu *et al.* 1998: 437-438; Daskalov 1997: 151). Economic protectionism also worked hand in hand with a conception of the Romanian nation as rural and agricultural in the depths of its collective soul on which the fascist and communist regimes were soon to capitalise.

It was in the early 1930s that the Romanian politics became tolerant of the criminal mixture of authoritarianism and national sovereignty discoursed in ethno-racist terms. The dominant public discourse in this context, much influenced by *Junimist* autochthonism (Bărbulescu *et al.* 1998: 391; Hitchins 1992: 1072-1073), was one of distrust toward liberal democracy and capitalism while sympathetic to Italian and German nationalist authoritarianisms. State corporatism was seen as ideal solution for protecting and promoting a Romanian industry and especially agriculture, the village being portrayed as the hearth of the Romanian nation.

This perspective was promoted among others by the influential Mihail Manoilescu whose view of ethnic minorities became clear in the 1930s when he would assert that Romania had no social but ethnic problems. In this context he identified capitalism with the Jewry that had to be eliminated through a revolution (Ioanid 2004: 440). The fascist Legionary movement will come to power in 1940 to fulfil such desiderata and its principles will dominate government under the dictatorship of Marshal Antonescu until the end of the Second World War.

These developments marked in fact the victory of conservative autochthonism distrustful of liberalism and disliking Europeanisation. The profound division between these two intellectual currents – nationalist autochthonism and Europeanism – marked the country's political modernity (Bărbulescu *et al.* 1998: 391-395; Iordachi and Trencsényi 2003: 416-417; Hitchins 1992: 1073; Korkut 2006: 134). However, the much higher popularity and the access to power of the autochthonist discourse of 'endogenous ethnospecificity' (Mincu 2009: 60) indicates that the ethno-nationalist card had been the winning one from the outset. Literary journals, especially *Cuvântul* (The Word) and *Gândirea* (The Thinking), were particularly influential in this

context. Their intellectual prestige arose with valuable contributions from cultural icons such as Lucian Blaga, Mircea Eliade, Constantin Brâncuși, Eugen Ionescu, Mircea Vulcănescu, Emil Cioran and others.

However, these publications gradually shifted toward an extreme nationalist discourse supporting the fascist movement. Manoilescu, Iorga, Alexandru C. Cuza, Nae Ionescu and Nichifor Crainic were among those promoting such discourse, which echoed the anti-Semitic predication of national sovereignty in the previous century. And the accession of some of them to various positions in the legislative and the executive branches of government placed these views at the heart of political power (Alexandrescu 2002: 159; Bărbulescu *et al.* 1998: 426; Bejan 2006: 115; Bochmann 2010: 123; Ioanid 2004: 432, 469). Iorga's enormous oeuvre in historiography in particular had a lasting impact on the Romanian political culture. His works insisted on the agrarian essence of an idealised Romanian past and these ideas were reflected in his political career as Member of Parliament, President of the National Assembly, minister and Prime Minister until 1940. In Iorga's theory, the ideal rural Romania was 'ethnically pure' (Ioanid 1992: 470) and religiously defined by an ethnicised Orthodoxy (Boia 2001: 119-120; Iordachi 2001: 171; Turda 2008: 446).

The effects of the violent peasant uprisings of 1907 and of economic decline after the Great Depression made extreme nationalism and anti-Semitism the winning political card in the 1930s. The Romanian youth especially was more and more ready to rally behind popular rightist intellectuals who favoured a narrow, Orthodox Christian identity of the nation clearly contrasting with the Jewish and Hungarian Catholic alterity. Orthodoxy was in fact so versatile that soon became part of the racial conception of the nation (Brunstein and Ronnkvist 2002: 221; Ioanid 1992: 473; McMahon 2009). The ideals of that generation of politicians were summarised by philosopher Nae Ionescu in three words: Orthodoxy, nationalism, and monarchy (Bochmann 2010: 123; Boia 2001: 146-147).

The political atmosphere growing increasingly hostile to non-Romanians was also reflected in the education policy, which would instil the state's nationalism in future generations. Constantin Angelescu, reformer of public instruction in the interwar period, made the imposition of a common political identity to all people an imperative of this policy, as expressed in three pieces of legislation in 1924, 1925 and 1928. Textbooks were to formulate the nation's historical presence cleared of ethnic impurities, the education policy aiming overall to impose 'teaching (in Romanian) of Romanian language, history, geography, and civics in non-Romanian schools' (Livezeanu 1995: 44-45). In the new territories, this effort was particularly intense as it had to eliminate competition from foreign elites that grew under former Austro-Hungarian, or Tsarist rule. The target was explicitly, indeed, the creation of an educated Romanian majority 'whose mobility to elite status the state now encouraged'

(Livezeanu 1995: 47-48). The reorganisation of the education system was entrusted to Onisifor Ghibu, a nationalist educator who summarised the principles of the reform as follows (*ibid.*: 155):

The day of December 1, 1918, inaugurates a new world: Românism [Romanianhood] has become free and its own master. It must build for itself its own state and set its own mission in this world. In this historic work, what role belongs to school and education? [...] The oppression of the Maghyar language [in Transylvania], [...] history, and [...] geography has fallen [...]. In high schools and the University instead of the Maghyar language, the French, English, and Italian languages [will be taught]. Romanian language, [...] history, [...] and] geography [will serve] the purpose of consolidating a new state and founding a nation.

The curricula reflected the offensive nationalism of the unified kingdom. A history book by Ion Popescu-Băjenaru was given the “Angelescu” Award by the Romanian Academy in 1925 for presenting the ‘popular masses’ with a story of the ‘millennial’ development of the nation and for its patriotic spirit (Popescu-Băjenaru 1925: 1). The Academy was thus licensing an idea, inherited from previous generations, of the national temporality stretching far beyond scientific evidence, hence excluding non-Romanianhood from regional history. Faithful to the Romantics’ ethnic conception of Orthodoxy, Popescu-Băjenaru’s “story” also built on the erroneous but politically lucrative idea that Christianity appeared north of Danube ‘ever since the Roman settlement in Dacia’ (*ibid.*: 30).

The fact that even today archaeologists cannot offer reliable evidence concerning the beginning of Christianity on the left bank of the Danube (Ahonen 2007: 23; Bărbulescu *et al.* 1998: 104) was not a matter of concern to the author and the Academy. Scientific accuracy did not matter since the public discourse and state policies were already dominated by the idea of the temporal simultaneity of and organic bond between Romanianhood and Orthodoxy for two thousand years (Stan and Turcescu 2007: 48). Given the absence from Popescu-Băjenaru’s textbook of any structured account of ethnic and religious minorities, it is clear that the respective work served only the radical individuation and anthropomorphisation (Heidegger 1962: 62) of the imagined community in a form of historical presence that inherently and concomitantly excluded ethnic otherness.

The same hostility permeated a high-school textbook penned by Iorga and published six years later. It perpetuated similar (Iorga 1931: 34, 36-37) and other myths while referring to minorities only in pejorative tone. The land inhabited by the Romanian brethren, or *neam*, within or without national borders was named by Iorga ‘Romanian land’ regardless of actual state borders

(*ibid.*: 4).⁴ The Romanian ethnoscape was thus dangerously expanding in the minds of very young pupils at a time when revisionism was yet again threatening the continent. It is however important to note that, from the perspective of the methodology adopted here, the (f)actualisation of this ethnoscape was engineered through the onomastic engineering of political nowness, the nation's objective presence legitimising both its historical presence and the abusive nationalisation of space. The entire section under the title 'Romanian Land' (Iorga 1931: 3-7) in the respective textbook portrays the Romanian people as having dwelled in the region from times immemorial and thus being incontestably entitled to master political nowness.

The immense intellectual prestige of Iorga contributed decisively to the long-term establishment of an understanding of history – inherited from previous generations – that blurred the line between patriotism and science (Bărbulescu *et al.* 1998: 392; Bejan 2006: 123; Boia 2001: 17). The imagined Romanian community thus became a onto-political 'reality' (Hitchins 1992: 1067; Turda 2008: 447) (f)actualised in popular conscience by generations of intellectuals from Kogălniceanu, to Xenopol and Iorga. At the centre of this tradition was undoubtedly a perception of the nation as objective presence instituting its own political nowness in terms profoundly inimical to ethno-religious otherness. The political alliance between Iorga and nationalist extremist A. C. Cuza, both initiated in German political philosophies by Maiorescu, only confirmed that racial-nationalism represented the winning card in domestic politics at that time (Brustein and Ronnkvist: 220; Trencsényi 2010: 348-349, 352; Turda 2008: 446).

Themes such as the nation's historical continuity, the organic link between Orthodox Christianity and Romanianhood, and the rural essence of the ethno-nation also benefited from their propagation in valuable literary works, such as Lucian Blaga's *Mioritic Space* (1936) and *Trilogy of Culture* (1944). While avoiding overt nationalism, this remarkable poet and philosopher portrayed the nation as born from the timeless purity of the village (1994: 166; 1995: 130) whence it 'boycotted' history (Blaga 1985: 307) with superiority over other nations (Boia 2001: 146; Korkut 2006: 136; Tănăsioiu 2005: 125). Accompanying Blaga's mysticism in the interwar period were other popular writers, such as Nichifor Crainic and Nae Ionescu.

Crainic's accession to the top editorial position at *Gândirea* turned that journal in the mouthpiece of Romanian peasantist fascism in the 1930s, which called for the state to become the embodiment of the racial nation, the monarchy, and Orthodoxy (Bejan 2006: 117-118; Hitchins 1992: 1073-1074; Leuștean 2007: 730; Turda 2008: 447). In typical *Junimist* tradition, Crainic and his followers accused the Europeanist elites for proposing a superficial

⁴ *Neam* and *popor* are Romanian words for kinship and the community of language, implying relations similar to family relations between descendants of the same ancestor, as in the German *Volk* (see, for instance, Neumann 2010; Csérge 2007: 37).

Romanian culture that lacked religious substance. Resonating with this view was metaphysician Nae Ionescu for whom Romanianhood and Orthodoxy were ontologically so much bound together that belonging to another religion meant automatic exclusion from the nation (Leuştean 2007: 729; Ornea 1995: 91-95). Theoretician of Romanian existentialism, Ionescu saw the West through Spenglerian lenses as succumbing to technologism while the Romanian culture could survive through its mystical, Orthodox spirituality, which had to be protected by an ethnocratic, organic, i.e. not contractual, regime (Bărbulescu *et al.* 1998: 426; Hitchins 1992: 1074; Ornea 1995: 71).

Nae Ionescu's influence on the interwar generation was enormous and he turned the high-quality journal *Cuvântul* into an extreme nationalist tribune (Bejan 2006: 117; Livezeanu 1995: 273). Part of that generation were would-be icons of Romanian culture, such as Mircea Eliade and Emil Cioran, who became supporters of the fascist Iron Guard, or Eugen Ionescu, Mihail Sebastian and Lucian Blaga, who eventually refrained from explicit political positions (Bejan 2006: 115; Hitchins 1992: 1074; Quinney 2007: 451). Nationalism of various intensities was, nevertheless, the norm of the day and it came as no surprise when it made the core of the Iron Guard's fascist ideology.

In September 1940, the Guard took power for 131 days under general Ion Antonescu as Prime Minister and its ideology remained at the heart of the state under Antonescu's subsequent personal regime until the end of World War Two and the establishment of the communist regime in 1947. While the attitude of the fascist state to the Hungarian minority remained reserved due to the wartime alliance with Budapest (Ioanid 1992; Gesin 2007: 66; Solonari 2006: 448), other minorities were brutally treated. The Jewish community especially suffered from the criminal acts of the Antonescu administration, hundreds of thousands of Jews being murdered in Romania and Transdnestrria during the war (Deletant 2006: 127; Gesin 2007).

These crimes were in fact subordinated to the imperative of purifying and Romanianising the country, which made victims among other minorities, too (Deletant 2006: 116-120, 128-130; Eminov 2000: 134). Antonescu was considered a symbol of ethno-nationalism and could retain power at a time when such attitudes were dominant in Romanian society after long decades of nationalist education hostile to internal ethnic others (Ioanid 2004: 434-435; Solonari 2006: 474-480). He gave in 1941 an honest expression of the values that those generations were raised with: 'That was how I grew up, with hatred against the Turks, Jews, and Hungarians. This sentiment of hatred against the enemies of the patria must be pushed to the last extreme. I take upon myself that responsibility' (quoted in Neumann 2010: 396).

The feelings that animated Antonescu's political and military actions were shared by large segments of the society. Romania joined Germany's effort in the Second World War with the aim of recovering Bessarabia from Soviet

Russia and northwest Transylvania from Hungary, and with the hope of eliminating the communist threat to the Romanian capitalist society. The Patriarch of the Orthodox Church himself called for a 'holy war' against the Soviet 'nation without God' (Leuștean 2007: 734). Defeat in war led nevertheless to the Red Army taking control of business in Eastern Europe. And, since there were only around 1000 members of the communist party at the end of the war (Chirot 1978: 460; Petrescu 2009: 526), Moscow appealed to the oppressed Jewish, Hungarian and other minorities to recruit supporters (Gallagher 2008: 44).

Hungarians, representing 12 per cent of the population in 1945 (Deletant 1995: 108), had contributed significantly to the ranks of communists in interwar Romania (Gallagher 2008: 44-47; Tismăneanu 2005: 88). After the Second World War they also formed – together with Jews, Bulgarians, Russians, Ukrainians and others – the core of the Romanian Workers' Party (RWP) for around a decade (Chirot 1978: 460; Câmpeanu 1991: 813; Deletant 1995: 108; Petrescu 2009: 526; Țărău 2006: 311-312). This multiethnic composition and the internationalist message of communism in general made of the short-lasting 1948 Constitution, establishing the communist Romanian state, the most minority-friendly charter in the country's history. Along with the specifically communist ideological precepts, the charter also adopted a non-ethnic definition of citizens who enjoyed equality before the law regardless of cultural differences (Romanian Constitution 1948: Article 16).

For the first time, a Romanian constitution contained the word 'Romanian' only in adjectival, i.e. not substantival form. Concepts like 'ethnicity', or 'minority' were also discarded from the political, administrative and legislative discourse following a decision in 1944, since they were reminiscent of the racial superiority theory of the previous regime (Țărău 2006: 307, note 2). Thus, the preferred term for ethnic minorities was that of 'co-existing nationalities' (Romanian Constitution 1948: Article 24), which implied some degree of inter-ethnic equality before the superior imperatives of communism. This meant that a strong consensus of ethno-sovereignty was missing for the first time in Romanian history and inter-ethnic *politics* could take place to a certain extent.

Representatives of ethnic minorities were co-opted in central and local government and under the Nationalities Status of 1945 the Hungarian language was used in public administration, RWP meetings, or in various economic sectors of public interest. The Hungarian-language Bolyai University was also established in 1946 while the Decree Law 629 of 3 August 1945 reaffirmed the constitutional definition of ethnic minorities as 'co-existing nationalities' (Culic 2006: 178 and note 20). Then a new Constitution was adopted in 1952 to express legally the Soviet domination over its vassal communist regime in Bucharest.

This charter preserved inter-ethnic equality and the primacy of communist ideals, the terms 'minority' and 'ethnic' being again absent from the text. It

granted the use of minority languages in education, local administration (Article 82), and in courts (Article 68). Article 17j, however, announced the future return of state nationalism by proclaiming that, 'the Romanian state, democratic-popular, unitary and independent, ensures the development of the Romanian people's culture and the culture of national minorities, socialist in content, national in form' (Romanian Constitution 1952). The formulation 'national minorities' suggested the subordination of minority cultures to that of the nominal ethnicity, which will be confirmed by subsequent state practices until the end of the communist regime.

On the surface, the 1950s represented a positive period for inter-ethnic relations in communist Romania. Minorities benefited from unprecedented government attention in line with Stalin's internationalist policies (Atanasova 2004: 362; Chirot 1978: 487-489; Eminov 2000: 134-136). The regime even established a Hungarian Autonomous District (HAD) in Transylvania where ethnic Hungarians represented over 77 per cent of the population and their language was used in schools and administration (Atanasova 2004: 362; Culic 2006: 178; Deletant 1995: 109-110; Gallagher 2008: 46-47). However, this autonomy was far from functional and depended in fact on the good will of central authorities in Bucharest that soon took control of its key institutions. Moreover, the 1956 anti-communist uprising in Hungary and the Soviet military intervention were to affect dramatically the condition of minorities in general and of the Hungarian minority in particular.

Within this context, the Soviet leadership started supporting new ruling groups, 'ethnically as representative as possible,' in its satellite states (Țărău 2006: 394-395). The communist regimes in Europe thus entered their nationalist phase. In Romania, this meant a return to the autochthonist predication of politics that will subordinate inter-ethnic relations to the "socialist nation", an euphemism for the dominant position of the ethnic majority (Culic 2006: 179; Petrescu 2009; Țărău 2005: 393). The communist elite and especially its leader, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, increasingly feared the spread among ethnic Hungarians of anti-Soviet ideas emanating from Budapest (Bărbulescu *et al.* 1998: 519-520; Chirot 1978: 488; Gallagher 2008: 54). Moreover, Gheorghiu-Dej also initiated a policy of disengagement from Moscow's lines.

Within this context, the Hungarian Bolyai University in Cluj-Napoca was forced in 1959 to merge with the Romanian Babeș University in a bilingual academic structure. As a consequence, the minority academics lost power of decision and the Hungarian pro-rector, his wife and five other professors committed suicide. Until the end of 1960, the distinct status of the Hungarian language was also eliminated at the Agricultural College and the Medical-Pharmaceutical Faculty in Târgu-Mureș.

All these episodes indicated a policy of integration aiming strategically in fact at diminishing the use of Hungarian language in public instruction by

promoting dual-language schools where Romanian language would eventually prevail (Bărbulescu *et al.* 1998: 520-521; Csergo 2007: 30-31; Culic 2006: 179; Deletant 1995: 112-113). Gheorghiu-Dej also eliminated his Hungarian, Jewish, and other minority rivals in the RWP, the party thus becoming dominated overwhelmingly by ethnic Romanians of which those with rural origins were especially preferred (Deletant 1995: 108-110; Gallagher 2008: 56-57; Korkut 2006: 141-142; Verdery 1991: 104). As a result, the ethnic minority intelligentsia gradually disappeared from the first line of domestic politics especially after the summer of 1956 (Tismăneanu 2005: 191). Following the withdrawal of the Soviet troops in 1958, Gheorghiu-Dej also engineered the elimination of Russian elements from the party structures. The ethno-nationalist essence of this approach was to be exacerbated under Nicolae Ceaușescu who implemented until 1989 a policy of national homogenisation through the assimilation of ethnic minorities in general and the Hungarian minority in particular (Chiot 1978: 488; Csergo 2007:30; Deletant 1995: 113; Gallagher 2008: 62; Panayi 2000: 181; Petrescu 2009: 523).

During Ceaușescu's first year in power, the RWP became the Romanian Communist Party (RCP) and the Grand National Assembly adopted the 1965 Constitution proclaiming the Socialist Republic. Some provisions in the text did guarantee the use of minority languages in education, the media, administration and courts (Romanian Constitution 1965: Articles 22, 109). The words "minority", or "ethnic" did not appear in the text, while the word "Romanian" was employed only in adjectival, i.e. not substantival form. Instead, the phrase 'co-existing nationalities' returned and remained the preferred formulation of the regime addressing minorities until December 1989. However, despite the appearance of respect for non-Romanian ethnic communities, this constitutional language will allow in fact for their subordination to the 'socialist nation' (Culic 2006: 180; Csergo 2007: 31; King 1973: 146-153).

During the first decade of Ceaușescu's rule, the RCP took some pro-minority measures. A department of Hungarian language and literature was opened at the University of Bucharest, the Kriterion Publishing House was established to promote minority literature, and minority languages could be heard in radio and TV broadcasting, or in musical, theatrical and other artistic manifestations (Deletant 1995: 114; King 1973: 158; Panayi 2000: 150-151). However, the regime will soon adopt practices contrary to this apparent support for minority cultures.

The first step in that direction was the Public Administration Law of 1968 designed to produce an administrative basis for modernisation from above, preparing the country for the socialist industry and agriculture. The law in fact abolished the HAD and Ceaușescu then imposed a version of that act establishing not one but two Hungarian districts, Harghita and Covasna, where the power of the numerically superior ethnic Hungarians in the region was

diffused. And the ethnic Hungarians were anyway to be gradually replaced with Romanians in key administrative positions in the two districts (Atanasova 2004: 362; Deletant 1995: 113-115; Newall 1988: 4). A policy of forced industrialisation and urbanisation was also to determine the emigration of young Hungarian university graduates to industrialised cities outside their home region, ethnic Romanians being encouraged to replace them (Deletant 1995: 108; Gallagher 2008: 69; Korkut 2006: 146; Panayi 2000: 42). Such developments turned minorities in general and the Hungarian minority in particular from individualised cultural communities into mere objects of state policies aiming overall at homogenising the population into a malleable mass fit for socialist engineering.

An important role in the process was played by the infamous political police, the *Securitate*, which had been acting against Hungarian, Jewish, German and other minority representatives ever since the beginning of communism in Romania (Securitate Directive 1951). In 1969, an article in the internal journal of this agency also mentioned concrete actions of the secret police against agents of Hungarian irredentism envisaging 'the annexation to Hungary of a territory [Transylvania] where their co-nationals dwell' (Kiss 1969: 28). A 1978 issue from the same journal pointed again at the need for the neutralisation of 'active elements that were part of former Hungarian, German, Ukrainian and other nationalist-fascist and irredentist organisations and parties' (Derscanu 1978: 7). However, such actions addressed individuals involved in more or less subversive actions, while Ceaușescu's policies of urbanisation and industrialisation affected entire ethnic communities and their cultural heritage.

The most painful was the urbanisation, which culminated toward the end of the regime with a 'systematisation programme' aiming at the replacement of thousands of villages with agro-industrial complexes (Gallagher 2008: 64; Ronnas 1989: 543-546; Turnock 1991: 253-256). Despite the programme affecting clearly the entire population of Romania, it led in the end to the destruction of hundreds of Hungarian villages. Thousands of Romanians were also resettled in Transylvania, this modifying the majority-minority ratios in some regions (Atanasova 2004: 363; Csergo 2007: 129; Gallagher 2008: 62; Newall 1988; Turnock 1991: 259). The legislative and policy initiatives under Ceaușescu can thus be described as attempting to undermine the objective presence of minorities in the country's public everydayness, this leaving the ethnic majority in dominant position. The nation's historical presence was also insistently imposed.

The total control of the public instruction meant however that the curricula was dominated by the RCP's ideology, which gradually left behind the internationalist message of communism and reactivated themes from the local tradition of nationalist autochthonism. Minority language schooling declined under Ceaușescu (Csergo 2007: 155-159; Eminov 2000) and the Hungarian minority was particularly affected. The proportion of pupils taking courses in Hungarian language at pre-university level declined from 8 per cent in 1956 to

5.5 per cent in 1975, while at the university level the decline was from 5.4 in 1970 to 3.7 per cent immediately after the fall of Ceaușescu (Csergo 2007: 157; Panayi 2000: 118-119). The American Helsinki Watch Committee signalled in this context that Hungarian-language schools were ‘systematically eliminated’ and the publisher of Hungarian textbooks *Kriterion* was closed by 1987. Additionally, entrance exams to secondary education were held in Romanian and Romanian teachers were systematically appointed to replace Hungarians (Newall 1988: 4).

The content of education and especially the teaching of history represented, however, the main engine of assimilation. In the pre-Ceaușescu period, under coordination by the head communist ideologue Mihail Roller, the official discourse carefully securitised historical time by subordinating virtually all major events to the Romanians’ perpetual fight for national liberation from under the yoke of ethnic others. This produced the subtle imposition of the ethno-nation’s historical presence in the conscience of pupils and students regardless of their actual ethnic identity. All temporality on ‘Romanian’ lands was abusively populated with ‘Romanian’ heroes of the working class. The Roman colonisation of Dacia became mainly a process of ‘social differentiation’ followed by the ‘popular struggle for liberation’ (Roller 1952: 42-43). The result was a totalitarian historiography that the post-1965 regime will fill with ethno-national symbols.

Ceaușescu signalled this move in 1966 by declaring publicly that Romania was not a multi-national, but a ‘united national state’ (Panayi 2000: 182). The abolishing of the HAD in 1968 gave factual sense to those words and by 1972 he was openly speaking about ‘the goal of national and social homogenisation’ (Gallagher 2008: 62). The specific elements of the socialist homogenisation strategy were already given in the so-called ‘July Theses’ of 1971, considered by Tismăneanu as marking the beginning of Ceaușescu’s personality cult (2005: 242).

He demanded that attention be given in all cultural forms to productions with a revolutionary character and counteracting the ‘not very becoming practice [...] of considering everything that is foreign to be better’ and the ‘prostration before [...] Western products’ (Ceaușescu 1972: 205). This ‘cultural revolution’ aimed strategically at legitimising the leader’s personal control of the regime (Tismăneanu 2005: 242-244; Verdery 1991: 107). It presupposed stressing the place of the RCP and particularly Ceaușescu’s in the continuation of the Romanian medieval principalities, with special attention given to education (Culic 2006: 179-180; Petrescu 2009: 533). However, this was obviously just another episode in the then long tradition of cultural exercises in national narcissism and the securitisation of temporality that marked the entire history of Romanian sovereignty.

At the heart of Ceaușescu’s strategy was the teaching of Romania’s history and geography guided by the principle of “protochronism” according to

which the Romanian nation predated all other ethnic groups in its own territory. This involved, yet again, the nationalisation of the past (Verdery 1991: Chapter 6) that, from the methodological perspective adopted here, presupposed the imposition of the nation's historical presence conditioning political ontology. The concept of protochronism meant the nation's uniqueness and exceptionalism, which implied the unilateral ethnicisation of past and present, hence of future. The term itself was strongly connected with Ceaușescu's 'July Theses'. They inspired a Romanian literary critic of the time, Edgar Papu, to write in mid-1970s with some impulse from Mircea Eliade (Manea 1991: 34-35) a series of works (Papu 1974; 1977) claiming the 'prophetic' character of Romanian literature, i.e. predating and announcing major cultural movements in Europe (Boia 2001: 80; Verdery 1991: 175).

Without rejecting the importance of synchronisation with European ideals, it was underlined that Europeanisation amounted to laggardness owing to the lack of attention to the original achievements in autochthonous Romanian culture (Papu 1977: 9; see also Hitchins 1992: 1078; Korkut 2006: 135). Thus, Papu's notion of protochronism came in continuation of the long autochthonist line initiated by *Junimea* (Cioroianu 2002: 366), once again filling Romanian cultural forms with a nationalist content. It implied the engineering of 'science of cultural otherness' evident in the excessive attention given to ethnographic research and the abusive politicisation, yet again, of the iconic Romanian peasant (Mitu 2006: 80).

The securitisation of the past through the construction of the nation's historical presence in this context built on 'a teleology of national continuity and an ideology of national values, premised on internal uniformity' (Verdery 1991: 131). With this historical presence occupying, under licence from the totalitarian regime, virtually the entire timeline of human history, the public predication of what was in fact a multicultural society became impossible in Romania. The exposure of pupils and students in the 1970s and 1980s to this engineering of time inevitably created then conditions for the perpetuation of state nationalism after 1989.

Research dedicated to the cultural aspects of Ceaușescu's policy of socialist homogenisation indicates that this intellectual tradition actually perpetuated the national identity formation process initiated around 1848 until our times (Petrescu 2007: 39). State nationalism inspired by this tradition became the official ideology of the regime in the 1970s and 1980s when protochronism saw a 'brilliant career' at the centre of virtually all forms of public art (Verdery 1991: 176). This was facilitated by the drastic curbing of the freedom of expression through government decrees, the first one issued in 1971, and in an atmosphere of terror engineered by the *Securitate*. Those who wanted their works published, including textbook authors, had to enter the lines of sycophant obedience toward the RCP leadership and propagate its socialist

ideology with a nationalist core (Bărbulescu *et al.* 1998: 542; Boia 2001: 80-81; Tismăneanu 2005: 250-252; Verdery 1991: 186).

This led inevitably to the production of exaggerations and distortions of history even more ridiculous and dangerous than the pre-communist ones. Under unchallengeable state authority, the ancient Dacian kings, *voivodes* of the Middle Ages, revolutionaries of 1848, or anonymous communists and other selected historical figures gradually took the central public stage as characters in heavily ideologised versions of Romanian ethno-history (Boia 2001: 78-82, 220-221; Brubaker 2004: 192; Petrescu 2009: 533; Verdery 1991: 224). Cohorts of more or less illustrious historical characters, all ethnicised Romanians, were to perform precise functions in the Party's engineering of the communist temporality. The story of each of them was presented in propaganda materials and textbooks to somehow announce the self-proclaimed greatest Romanian leader in history, i.e. Ceaușescu himself and his epochal achievements. In this scheme, even Hungarian princes of the late thirteenth century were turned into fighters for Romanians' liberation in Transylvania (Boia 2001: 222).

Protochronism demanded as many events in the Romanianised history to be portrayed as anticipating major European events such as the French Revolution, the 1848 movements and especially socialism. An obscure text titled *Teachings of Neagoe Basarab* from the beginning of sixteenth century was even presented as superior to and announcing Machiavelli's *Prince*, this defying an elementary sense of chronology. What mattered was that the *Teachings* were 'Romanian' and prefigured the national state's authority, so brilliantly continued under Ceaușescu himself (*ibid.*: 80). A peasant uprising against feudal serfdom and inequality between Romanians and Hungarians in Transylvania toward the end of the nineteenth century also became "revolution" and interpreted as announcing the socialist liberation of working classes (*ibid.*: 80-81; Verdery 1991: 231-234).

Also instrumental in the process was a massive cinematographic production abundant in themes such as the continuation of the Latin ethnic stock in Romania, the superiority of this civilisation to that of nomadic Hungarian and Slavic peoples, and Romanians' historical struggle for independence against all enemies (Boia 2001: 221-222; Korkut 2006: 145; Petrescu 2007: 37-54). The national art festival *Cântarea României* (Praise to Romania) played a central role in this context. Initiated in 1976 and taking place annually until 1989, it was designed to homogenise public culture through regional and national activities of megalomaniac dimensions, gathering virtually all artistic manifestations (Petrescu 2009: 535-536).

Participating in these efforts were most citizens, regardless of profession and ethno-religious identity. Central in these mega-manifestations were the historical myths propagated unabashedly by the regime. The figure of national poet Eminescu and the folkloric ballad *Miorița*, symbolising the connection

between the national soul and a universal eternity, were omnipresent (Manea 1991: 35; Tănăsioiu 2008: 102-103). Even the roots of national communism were presented as originating in the communal life of ancient Dacia, which made Dacians particularly popular among sycophant historiographers (Cioroianu 2002: 366-367; Korkut 2006: 145-146). Previously politically incorrect figures, such as Lucian Blaga, also returned to the public discourse with the *Cântarea României* festival (Boia 2001: 148; Tănăsioiu 2008: 97-98). Ethnographic themes were borrowed even from the interwar, legionary past. These were cleared of Orthodoxism, catalogued conveniently by communist sociologists as 'patriotic exaggerations', and then integrated without scruples into the socialist culture (Marian-Bălașa 2007: 198).

Archaeologists, too, participated with significant contributions to the protochronist securitisation of historical time. The Ceaușescu regime extended the temporal line of ethno-historical continuity from the archaeologically identifiable Dacian-Roman coexistence to ungraspable beginnings in pre-Roman, Dacian history (Cioroianu 2002: 366-367). Historians associated with the regime claimed that all Romanians descended directly from the Dacians. The communist authorities even organised in 1980 the celebration of 2050 years from the establishment of the first 'centralised, unified and independent Dacian state' as forerunner of centralised, unified and independent communist Romania. A most incredible exaggeration on this theme was the proclamation in the journal of the RCP's Institute for the History of the Party of the Latin language being actually descended from Dacian (Boia 2001: 102-103).

Under such conditions, one can accept the validity of Verdery's assertion that the official discourse under the communist regime recasted temporality precisely to exclude ethnic minorities from the community of values (1991: 248-249). As a result, they were left indeed only with the role of scapegoats in times of economic and political hardships (Chen 2003: 169; Troie 2004: 41; Verdery 1991: 86), which will culminate with the fall of the regime in 1989. The blaming of the ethnic minorities for the nation's misfortunes was perpetuated, however, during and after Romanian revolution of 1989 (Petrescu 2010), and continues to mark the post-communist politics in Romania.

By Way of Conclusion: the Unending Story of Ethnicised Temporality under Romanian Sovereignty

State nationalism with authoritarian reflexes remained a feature of the post-communist regimes, too, even if in softer forms, under the 1991 Constitution speaking of the centrality of the nationalist theme in the discourse of sovereignty (Bakk and Szász 2010: 25; Mihăilescu 2005: 30; Tănăsioiu 2005: 125). While it can be accepted that the post-1989 Romania has not developed a policy aiming

explicitly to annihilate ethnic minorities, important aspects in the general public discourse has fuelled inter-ethnic hatred (Csergo 2007: 59, 64; Weber 1998: 147). Within this context, the Hungarian minority was among the first to claim rights, especially concerning all-level education and separate schools in the mother tongue. This led in turn to raising suspicion among Romanians vis-à-vis Hungarians loyalty to the post-communist state. The relations between the two ethnic groups turned violent in the city of Târgu-Mureș in March 1990 and this increased the level of mutual distrust (Gallagher 1995: 88; Tănăsioiu 2005: 125). The 1991 Constitution contributed then decisively to this atmosphere by securitising, yet again, the post-communist state's sovereignty through an ethno-national discourse.

Article 1 in the fundamental law (Romanian Parliament 1991) proclaims Romania a 'sovereign, independent, unitary and indivisible National State', thus setting the legal framework for the conflation of ethnicity and citizenship (Troie 2004: 42). This marked a regrettable return to the ethno-logic behind the pre-communist Constitutions of 1866 and 1923 analysed above. When corroborated with Article 4(1) founding the state on the 'unity of the Romanian people', the ethnicisation effect of this charter is evident, which became a matter of serious concern to the Hungarians fearing assimilation (Weber 1998: 149). Also, while Article 6 recognises and guarantees the preservation of the cultural, religious, linguistic and ethnic identity of minorities, Article 13 indicates Romanian as the sole official language of the state (Romanian Parliament 1991). And it was against this particular provision that the Hungarian political representatives have constantly raised the strongest objections.

Indeed, such provisions and others analysed below asserted abusively the *objective presence* of the nation as condition of political life in defiance of Romania's multicultural (f)actual life. All post-1989 census data indicate the clear numeric superiority of the Romanians over the Hungarians, Roma and other ethnic groups, but at the same time they show clearly that Romanians are *not alone* in the country. The 1991 Constitution also contains the term 'national minorities', used previously only in 1952 and implying their subordination to the ethnic majority. This subordination is also implied in Article 12 where the 1st of December is declared the National Day. The provision sanctions constitutionally the 'happiest day' of the Romanian nation in 1918, defying arrogantly its being considered the most painful in Hungarian history, as the day when Transylvania and other provinces formed Greater Romania (Troie 2004: 42).

This lack of respect toward the Hungarian minority was also confirmed in a 1992 opinion issued by some of the drafters of the constitution stating that, in their understanding, the state was the expression of the human community *qua* national community. More specifically, the concept of nation was considered more compatible with the notion of 'human community'. That was because, unlike the notion of 'society', a human community 'expresses precisely the

history of those composing the nation, the genetic ties between the successive generations and their members' willingness to live together' (quoted in Weber 1998: 150). Such provisions and interpretations, reminding of obsolete racial views, encode then legally the actual exclusion from "normal" politics of those who do not fit in an ethno-genetic definition of the national community. Moreover, this constitutional setting of the post-communist Romanian polity is securely fixed in temporality. Article 152(1) indicates in this sense that the constitutional provisions regarding 'the national, independent, unitary and indivisible character of the Romanian State [...] and [its] official language *shall not* be subject to revision' (Romanian Parliament 1991, emphasis added).

This illustrates, from the perspectives adopted here, the arrogant fixation of human life through onomastic-linguistic particularisation in the political time of the imagined community. While the 1991 Constitution is applicable throughout the territory of Romania, its Article 152 imposes its limitless temporal scope, i.e. its foreverness. Given the state's national character, insisted upon throughout the entire constitution, this foreverness means in fact the ethnicisation of all imaginable political temporality.

Having to dwell in this ethnicised time, the Hungarians were the 'most vocal' opponent of the national definition of the polity and the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania (DUHR) became the most active promoter of their interests in Parliament (Csergo 2007: 58-59; Mihăilescu 2008: 557, 561-562, 575; Weber 1998: 149). Following the 1996 elections when Romania saw its first truly democratic change in government (Deletant and Siani-Davies 1998: 155; Mather 2004: 109), the DUHR entered the coalition government and was to remain there, in most subsequent coalitions. Under these conditions, the party has traditionally insisted on promoting a political agenda challenging the ethnic majority's discourse of national sovereignty. This has built in turn on the so-called Cluj Declaration (25 October 1992), which proposed a public focus on human rights, equality, decentralisation of administration, and an impartial legal system as guarantees for the betterment of minority conditions (Csergo 2002, p. 10; Mihăilescu 2008, p. 576).

Significantly, the Proclamation indicated that, after decades of suffering from the lack of rights under Romanian sovereignty, the Hungarian community saw such desiderata guaranteed only if the state is reconstituted on the principle of inter-ethnic equality. This principle presupposed the internal 'self-determination' for the Hungarian community as a 'state-building' or 'state-constituting' nation together with the Romanian majority. The logic behind this was that, '[t]he Hungarian community in Romania constitutes a political subject, it is a state-constituting factor, and as such it is an equal partner of the Romanian nation' (Csergo 2007: 37-38; see also Bugajski 2002: 867). This perspective represents to this day the basis of the DUHR agenda, with reference to all minorities in the country (UDMR 2008). From the methodological perspective employed here, the DUHR discourse has

coherently contested for the first time in Romania's history the ethno-consensus of ethno-national sovereignty by destabilising its reliance on the quantitative superiority of the ethnic majority. It insists instead that all ethnic communities in the country are equally valuable *per se* and, consequently, equally entitled to participate in the constitution of the sovereign consensus.

Coupled with the exogenous pressures from the conditionality for accession to the membership of the European Union (EU), such endogenous pressures determined eventually the thawing of inter-ethnic relations in Romania after 1993. First, the authorities in Bucharest established the National Minorities Council as a consultative body and communication channel with legally constituted organisations of national minorities. Also in 1993, the DUHR submitted to the Romanian Parliament a draft bill entitled Law on National Minorities and Autonomous Communities authored originally by the Democratic Forum of Germans in Romania (Bakk and Szász 2010: 25; Weber 1998: 168). This draft bill proclaimed the inalienable right, *equal* to that of the sovereign majority, to regional autonomy for national minorities defined essentially as having a communal life and, therefore, entitled to territorial self-government. The DUHR leaders (Borbely 2009) see the respective draft as a 'comprehensive majority-minority contract' (Csergo 2002: 10).

However, the context leading to the signing of the Hungary-Romania bilateral treaty and the agenda of the two countries' integration in the EU and NATO have postponed a serious debate on that draft bill and the issue of autonomy (Atanasova 2004: 413, 418; Csergo 2007: 108; Culic 2006: 186). Moreover, the inclusion of the draft bill on the working agenda of the Parliament has also been systematically avoided by the Romanian parties up to the moment of writing. The EU accession conditionality also failed to address deeply rooted reflexes of national sovereignty. Under Union's eyes, the political parties representing the Romanian majority imposed in Parliament the adoption of the Local Administration Law 69/1991 and the Education law 84/1995 producing until the end of the 1990s a (f)actual environment unfriendly to ethnic minorities (Csergo 2002: 9-10, 2007: 68; Mihăilescu 2005: 31; Mincu 2009; Weber 1998: 157, 160-161). The content of curricula for history teaching in particular was humiliating for minority children who had to study the history of the country they belonged to as 'History of Romanians', i.e. not "of Romania" at all instruction levels (Borbely 2009; Murgescu 2001: 280; Weber, 160-161).

Unfortunately, the EU enlargement did not address specifically these shortcomings and the Commission gradually changed its focus during the second half of the 1990s toward the socio-economic problems of the Roma community. Moreover, the Union also began to generally avoid issues concerning collective minority rights (Toggenburg 2005: 733) and preferred instead to contribute only 'to the creation of domestic political space for minority participation' (Sasse 2009: 27). Following the inclusion of the DUHR

in the 1996-2000 government coalition, amendments to the laws on public local government and education demanded by DUHR and the EU were eventually promoted in May 1997 through emergency ordinances, followed later by adoption in Parliament (Csergo 2002: 23; Weber 1998: 166).

Article 23(6) in the ordinance on local administration, adopted as Public Administration Law No. 212 by parliament in 2001, allowed for the use of minority languages in public administration 'where a national minority represents over 20 per cent of the population'. Articles 55(3) and 58(2, 4) stipulated that persons belonging to ethnic minorities could be employed in local administration in such areas (Weber 1998: 167-168). The emergency ordinance on education, adopted eventually by the Parliament in 1999, stipulated guarantees for the education in the minority languages in public schools from primary to graduate levels. Following mediation between political parties from the OSCE High Commissioner for National Minorities, van der Stoep, departments and programmes in both Hungarian and German languages were established at the Babeş-Bolyai University. However, resistance on behalf of central authorities to fundamental change in this sense remains evident and there are no international norms guiding Romania for the implementation of a minority friendly education policy (*ibid.*: 158).

Successive Romanian governments that included the DUHR were in this context more preoccupied to create a positive international image essential for the country's perspectives of Euro-Atlantic integration, while the stance of the DUHR concerning the political status of the Hungarian minority became less and less disturbing in Bucharest (Csergo 2007: 85). Therefore, the Romanian performance concerning the minority conditionality was characterised as 'increasingly "accommodating diversity", although not without continued difficulty, substantial debate, and certain limits' (Ram 2009: 182).

In 2003, under pressure from the European Commission expressed in the Regular Reports, amendments to the 1991 Constitution were adopted with unanimity by the Parliament. They improved the quality of the judiciary and also granted the use of minority languages in the justice system and local public administration (Csergo 2007: 91-92). This was followed by a period of relative public silence concerning ethnic minority rights. Only 7 years later, in the beginning of 2011, the DUHR could celebrate the adoption in Parliament and the ratification by the President of a new education law, which has finally allowed teaching in Hungarian, including for 'Romanian' history and geography courses.

However, the draft law on the statute of national minorities proposed by DUHR ever since mid-1990s has remained only registered as item 502/26.10.2005 for debate in the Chamber of Deputies, but no further progress has been made up to date. Among the reasons for the blocking in Parliament is Article 2 in the draft stating that communities, not individuals, constitute the state, a description understood as unconstitutional by political parties representing

the Romanian majority. Overall, the Romanian authorities have preferred to insist on granting individual political rights, while actually continuing to predicate the human domain as belonging to one, sovereign national community. The Hungarian minority has insisted in response on its right to territorial autonomy. This has been a general tendency among historical minorities in Eastern Europe (Kymlicka 2007: 385), which see minority rights as mere 'cover for the supremacy by the dominant national group' (Atanasova 2004: 357).

It can be asserted consequently that even the conditionality for accession to the "supranational" EU could not undo Romania's ethno-sovereign self and its 'propensity toward nationalism' (Tănăsioiu 2008: 81). When the DUHR proposed that the source of Romanian sovereignty be reformulated with the 2003 amendments to the Constitution as deriving from the 'citizens of Romania' instead of the 'Romanian people', the political parties of the ethnic majority repeatedly rejected the proposal (Csörgő 2007: 93; Gallagher 2008: 258-259). And once the membership in the Union ceased to be an incentive after 2007, there is nothing in view that could determine the desecuritisation of Romania's sovereign ethno-subjectivity.

Lack of finance, coherent strategies and alternative sources of imagination make change superficial especially in the post-communist Romanian educational system (Mincu 2009: 71-72). A profound alteration of traditional autochthonist views is thus to take generations from now on. Until then, children from the Hungarian minority may continue to hear pedagogues teaching, for instance, that their forefathers accepted with difficulty the Union of 1918 despite the 'generous' policies of interwar Greater Romania (Murgescu 2001: 284-285). A de-ethnicisation of sovereignty in this country remains therefore a project yet to be initiated. This research has theorised and evidenced the national sovereignty as being apt to engineer its domain through the securitisation of ethnicity, which makes multicultural politics of inter-ethnic equality virtually impossible.

Altering the mechanisms behind such engineering would have to somehow build on this theorisation and address the central role of intellectual productions in this context. Intellectual elites are eventually responsible for producing in public discourse the limits to popular imagination regarding possibilities of political life. And the right path toward expanding those possibilities may be found by merely following in the footsteps of Heidegger. He warned about the oppression of language over Being whose authenticity we could regain by refraining from too much use of language and by learning to live as much as possible in the nameless (1993: 221-223). In the end, avoiding the sophisticated engineering of political time under national onomastics may call for the consistent avoidance of onomastics altogether and for a language constitutional law constituting anew political spaces as neutral as possible vis-à-vis cultural identity.

REFERENCES

- Agamben Giorgio, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1998.
- Agamben, G. *State of Exception*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2005.
- Ahonen Pertti, „Ethnonationalism in European East – West Borderlands: *Weltanschauungen* in the European Union and Central and Eastern Europe”, *Religion, State & Society* 35(1): 2007, pp. 5-41.
- Alexandrescu Sorin, “Towards a Modern Theory of Romanian Nationalism in the Interwar Period” in: I. Vainovski-Mihai (ed.) *Nation and National Ideology: Past, Present and Prospects*. Bucharest: New Europe College, 2002 138-164. Available via: New College Europe <http://www.nec.ro/fundatia/nec/publications/nation.pdf> [Accessed 16 March 2012].
- Anderson, B., *Imagined Communities*, London, Verso, 2006.
- Aron R., *Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations*, London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1966.
- Atanasova, I. N., ‘Transborder Ethnic Minorities and Their Impact on the Security of Southeastern Europe’, *Nationalities Papers*, 32, 2, June, 2004.
- Bakk Miklos, Alpar Z. Szász (2010), “Conflict and Convergence: Regionalisation plans and Autonomy Movements in Romania”, *Acta Universitatis Sapientiae – European and Regional Studies* 1(1): 19-32. Available at: <http://www.acta.sapientia.ro/acta-euro/C1-1/euro11-2.pdf> [Accessed 20 January 2012].
- Bartelson Jens, *A Genealogy of Sovereignty*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.
- Barzilai Gad, *Communities and Law: Politics and Cultures of Legal Identities*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2005.
- Bădăraș Gabriel, *Academia Mihăileană 1835-1848: menirea patriotică a unei instituții de învățământ* [The Mihailean Academia 1835-1848: the Patriotic Vocation of an Education Institution]. Iași, Junimea, 1987.
- Bărbulescu Mihai, Dennis Deletant, Keith Hitchings, Șerban Papacostea, Pompiliu Teodor, *Istoria României* [History of Romania], Bucharest, Editura Enciclopedică, 1998.
- Bejan Cristina, “The Paradox of the Young Generation in Inter-War Romania”, *Slovo* 18(2): 115-128, 2006.
- Blaga Lucian, *Trilogia culturii. Opere 9*. [The Trilogy of Culture. Oeuvres 9], Bucharest, Minerva, 1985.
- Blaga Lucian, *Spațiul mioritic* [The Mioritic Space]. Bucharest, Humanitas, 1994.
- Blaga Lucian, *Opera poetică* [Poetic oeuvre]. Bucharest, Humanitas, 1995.
- Bleiker Roland, Mark Chou, “Nietzsche’s Style: On Language, Knowledge and Power in International Relations”, in: C. Moore, C. Farrands (eds.), *International Relations Theory and Philosophy: Interpretive Dialogues*, London and New York, Routledge, 2010, pp. 8-19.
- Boatcă Manuela, “Knocking on Europe’s Door: Romanian Academia between Communist Censorship and Western Neglect”, *South Atlantic Quarterly* 105(3): 2006, pp. 551-579.
- Bochmann Klaus, “Conceptul de patriotism în cultura română” [The Concept of Patriotism in Romanian Culture], in: V. Neumann, A. Heinen (eds.) *Istoria României prin concepte: perspective alternative asupra limbajelor social-politice* [History of Romania in Concepts: Alternative Perspectives Concerning Socio-Political Language], Iași and Bucharest, Polirom, 2010, pp. 103-128.
- Boia Lucian, *History and Myth in Romanian Consciousness*, Budapest, Central European University Press, 2001.
- Borbély Laszlo, Author interview. Laszlo Borbély currently represents the Hungarian minority in the Romanian Chamber of Deputies and in the executive, 2009.
- Borislavov Rad, “Agamben, Ontology, and Constituent Power”, *Debatte*, 13(2): (2005), pp. 173-84.

- Brezeanu Stelian, *Romanitatea orientală în Evul Mediu* [Oriental Romanity in the Middle Ages]. Bucharest: ALL Educational Publishing, 1999.
- Brubaker Rogers *Ethnicity without Groups*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Brustein William, Ronnkvist Amy, "The Roots of Anti-Semitism: Romania before the Holocaust", *Journal of Genocide Research* 4(2): 2004, pp. 211-235.
- Bugajski, Janusz, *Political Parties of Eastern Europe: a Guide to Politics in the Post-Communist Era*, New York, M.E. Sharpe, 2002.
- Buzan Barry, Ole Wæver, Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework of Analysis*. Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 1988.
- Câmpeanu Pavel, "Nationalist fervour in Eastern Europe: the case of Romania", *Social Research* 58(4), 1991 805-828.
- Ceașescu Nicolae, *Romania on the Road to Building Up the Multilaterally Developed Socialist Society: Reports, Speeches, Articles, May 1971-February 1972*, vol. 6. Bucharest, Meridiane, 1972.
- Chen Chang, "The Roots of Illiberal Nationalism in Romania: a Historical Institutional Analysis of the Leninist Legacy", *East European Politics and Societies*, 2003, 17(2): 166-201.
- Chirot Daniel, "Social Change in Communist Romania", *Social Forces* 57(2): 1978, pp. 457-499.
- Cioroianu Adrian, "Les avatars d'une 'nation ex-communiste' – un regard sur l'historiographie roumaine récente" [The Avatars of an 'Ex-Communist Nation': a Perspective on Recent Romanian Historiography], in: I. Vainovski-Mihai (ed.) *Nation and National Ideology: Past, Present and Prospects*, Bucharest: New Europe College, 2002, pp. 352-376. Available via: New College Europe <http://www.nec.ro/fundatia/nec/publications/nation.pdf> [Accessed 16 March 2012].
- Csergo Zsuzsa, "Beyond Ethnic Division: Majority-Minority Debate about the Post-Communist State in Romania and Slovakia", *East European Politics and Societies* 16(1): 2002, pp. 1-29.
- Csergo Zsuzsa, *Talk of the Nation: Language and Conflict in Romania and Slovakia*, Ithaca and London, Cornell University Press, 2007.
- Culic Irina, "Dilemmas of Belonging: Hungarians from Romania", *Nationalities Papers*, 2006, 34(2): 175-200.
- Daskalov Roumen, "Ideas about, and Reactions to Modernization in the Balkans". *East European Quarterly*, 31(2), 1997, pp. 141-180.
- Deletant Dennis, *Ceașescu and the Securitate: Coercion and Dissent in Romania, 1965-1989*, London, C. Hurst & Co., 1995.
- Deletant Dennis, *Hitler's Forgotten Ally: Ion Antonescu and His Regime, Romania 1940-1944*, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2006.
- Deletant Dennis, Peter Siani-Davies, "The Romanian Elections of November 1996", *Representation* 35(2): 1998, pp. 155-167.
- Derrida Jacques, *Positions*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1981.
- Derrida Jacques, *Margins of Philosophy*, Brighton, Harvester, 1982.
- Derrida Jacques, *Of Grammatology*. Baltimore and London: John Hopkins University Press, 1997.
- Derrida Jacques, "The 'World' of the Enlightenment to Come (Exception, Calculation, Sovereignty)", *Research in Phenomenology*, 2003, pp. 33: 9-52.
- Derscanu Gheorghe, "Organizarea și desfășurarea muncii informativ operative" [...] [The Organisation and Undertaking of Informative-Operative Work ...]. *Securitatea* [online] 4(44): 5-9. Available via: Romanian Council for the Study of Securitate Archives (http://cnsas.ro/periodicul_securitatea.html) [Accessed 12 December 2011], 1978.
- Eminov Ali, "Turks and Tatars in Bulgaria and the Balkans", *Nationalities Papers*, 28(1): 2000, pp. 129-164.
- Escudier Alexandre, "Semantica istorică, modernitatea politică și istoria României (1780-1939). Câteva considerații" [Historical Semantic, Political Modernity and Romanian History (1780-1939). Some Considerations], in: V. Neumann, A. Heinen (eds.), *Istoria României*

- prin concepte: perspective alternativă asupra limbajelor social-politice* [History of Romania in Concepts: Alternative Perspectives Concerning Socio-Political Language]. Iași and Bucharest: Polirom, 2010, pp.53-80.
- Feldman Eliyahu, "The QUESTION of Jewish Emancipation in the Ottoman Empire and the Danubian Principalities after the Crimean War", *Jewish Social Studies* 41(1): 1979, pp. 41-74.
- Freeman Michael, *Human Rights: an Interdisciplinary Approach*. Cambridge and Malden, Polity Press, 2002.
- Gadamer Hans-Georg, *Truth and Method*, New York: Continuum, 1998.
- Gallagher Tom, *Modern Romania: the End of Communism, the Failure of Democratic Reform, and the Theft of a Nation*, New York: New York University Press, 2008.
- Gesin Michael, "Holocaust Case Study: Genocide in Transnistria", *Australian Journal of Jewish Studies* 21: 2007, pp.49-94.
- Giddens Anthony, *The Consequences of Modernity*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1990.
- Giurescu Constantin, *Despre boieri și despre rumâni* [On Boyars and Rumâns], Bucharest, Compania, 2008.
- Guzzini Stefano, "The Concept of Power: A Constructivist Analysis" *Millenium* 33(3): 2005 495-521.
- Gledhill John, "The Power of Ethnic Nationalism: Foucault's Bio-Power and the Development of Ethnic Nationalism in Eastern Europe", *National Identities* 7(4): 347-368.
- Heidegger Martin, *Being and Time*, New York, Harper One, 2005.
- Hitchings Keith, "Samuel Clain and the Rumanian Enlightenment in Transylvania", *Slavic Review* 23(4): 1964, pp. 660-675.
- Hitchings Keith, Romania. *The American Historical Review* 97(4): 1992, pp. 1064-1083.
- Hitchings Keith, *Afirmarea națiunii: mișcarea națională românească din Transilvania, 1860-1914* [A Nation Affirmed: the Romanian National Movement in Transylvania, 1860-1914], Bucharest, Editura Enciclopedică, 2000.
- Iijima Edda B., "Conceptul de constituție în istoria gândirii juridice românești" [The Concept of Constitution in the History of Romanian Juridical Thought], in V. Neumann, A. Heinen (ed.s) *Istoria României prin concepte: perspective alternativă asupra limbajelor social-politice* [History of Romania in Concepts: Alternative Perspectives Concerning Socio-Political Language], Iași and Bucharest, Polirom, 2010, pp. 299-321.
- Illyes Elemer, *National Minorities in Romania: Change in Transylvania*, Boulder, CO: Columbia University Press, 1982.
- Ioanid Radu, "Nicolae Iorga and fascism", *Journal of Contemporary History* 27(3): 1992 467-492.
- Ioanid Radu, "The Sacralised Politics of the Romanian Iron Guard", *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions*, 5(3): 2004, pp. 419-453.
- Iordache Anastasie, *Instituirea monarhiei constituționale și a regimului parlamentar în România* [The Institution of the Constitutional Monarchy and the Parliamentary Regime in Romania], Bucharest, Madajahonda, 1997.
- Iordachi Constantin, "The Unyielding Boundaries of Citizenship: The Emancipation of Non-Citizens in Romania, 1866-1918", *European Review of History – Revue européenne d'histoire* 8(2): 2001, pp. 157-186.
- Iordachi Constantin, Balázs Trencsényi, "In Search of a Usable Past: The Question of National Identity in Romanian Studies, 1990-2000", *East European Politics and Societies* 17(3): 2003, pp. 415-453.
- Iorga Nicolae, *Istoria românilor* [History of Romanians], Vălenii de Munte, Datina Românească, 1931.
- Jackson Preece, *Minority Rights: between Diversity and Community*, Cambridge and Malden, Polity Press, 2005.
- James Alan, "The Practice of Sovereign Statehood in Contemporary International Society" *Political Studies* 47(3): 1999, pp. 457-473.
- King Robert R., *Minorities under Communism: Nationalities as a Source of Tension among Balkan Communist States*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973.

- Kiss Ludovic, "Particularități ale activității ostile dusă de persoane din rândul naționalității maghiare" [Particularities Concerning Hostile Activities by Persons of Hungarian Nationality], *Securitatea* [online] 3(7): 1969, pp. 27-32. Available via: Romanian Council for the Study of Securitate Archives (http://cnsas.ro/periodicul_securitatea.html) [Accessed 16 March 2012].
- Kogălniceanu Mihail, *Texte social-politice alese* [Selected Social-Political Texts]. Bucharest, Editura Politică, 1967.
- Korkut Umut, "Nationalism Versus Internationalism: the Roles of Political and Cultural Elites in Interwar and Communist Romania", *Nationalities Papers* 34(2): 2006, pp. 131-155.
- Krasner Stephen D., *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999.
- Kymlicka Will, "National Cultural Autonomy and International Minority Rights Norms" *Ethnopolitics* 6(3): 2007, pp. 379-393.
- Leuștean Lucian N., 'For the Glory of Romanians: Orthodoxy and Nationalism in Greater Romania, 1918-1945', *Nationalities Papers* 35(4): 2007, pp. 717-726.
- Livezeanu Irina (1995), *Cultural Politics in Greater Romania*, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.
- Lovinescu Eugen, *Istoria civilizației române moderne* [The History of Modern Romanian Civilisation], Bucharest, Editura Științifică, 1972.
- Macmillan Margaret, *Paris 1919: Six Months that Changed the World*, New York: Random House, 2001.
- Maiorescu Titu, *Critice* [Critiques], Bucharest, Editura pentru Literatură, 1966.
- Manea Norman, "Happy Guilt", *New Republic* 205(6): 1991, pp. 27-36.
- Manning Erin, "Time for Politics", in: J. Edkins, V. Pin-Fat, M. Shapiro (eds.), *Sovereign Lives: Power in Global Politics*, New York, Routledge, 2004, pp. 61-78.
- Marian-Bălașa, Marin, "On the Political Contribution of Ethnomusicology: from Fascist Nationalism to Communist Ethnocentrism", *Journal of Musicological Research*, 26(2): 2007, pp. 193-213.
- Mateescu Dragoș C., "The Time beyond Space: Exploring Alternative Directions for the Analysis of Identity Formation in the Cases of Romania and Turkey", *Europolis* 1(4): 2008, pp. 287-307.
- Mather Janet, "The Citizenry: Legitimacy and Democracy", in N. Nudent (ed.), *European Union Enlargement*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004, pp. 103-117.
- Mârza Iacob, "Conceptul de educație în gândirea iluminist-romantică a românilor din Transilvania" [The Concept of Education in the Enlightenment-Romanticist Thought of Romanians in Transylvania], in V. Neumann, A. Heinen (eds.), *Istoria României prin concept* [History of Romania in Concepts], Iași and Bucharest, Polirom, 2010, pp. 81-101.
- McMahon Richard, "On the Margins of International Science and National Discourse: National Identity Narratives in Romanian Race Anthropology", *European Review of History – Revue européenne d'histoire*, 16(1): 2009, pp. 101-123.
- Mihăilescu Mihaela, "Dampening the Powder Keg: Understanding Interethnic Cooperation in Post-Communist Romania (1990-96)", *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 11(1): 2005, pp. 25-59.
- Mihăilescu Mihaela, "The Politics of Minimal 'Consensus': Interethnic Opposition Coalitions in Post-Communist Romania (1990-96) and Slovakia (1990-98)", *East European Politics and Societies* 22(3): 2008, pp. 553-594.
- Mill John S., *Utilitarianism, on Liberty and Considerations on Representative Government*. London, J. M. Dent, 1972.
- Mincu Monica E., "Myth, Rhetoric, and Ideology in Eastern European Education: Schools and Citizenship in Hungary, Poland, and Romania", *European Education*, 41(1): 2009, 55-78.
- Mitu Sorin, *National Identity of Romanians in Transylvania*, Budapest and New York: Central European University Press, 2001.
- Mitu Sorin, *Transilvania mea: istorii, mentalități, identități* [My Transylvania: HISTORIES, Mentalities, Identities], Iași, Polirom, 2006.

- Murgescu Mirela L., *Între 'bunul creștin' și 'bravul român': rolul școlii primare în construirea identității românești (1831-1878)* [Between the 'Good Christian' and the 'Brave Romanian': the Role of Primary School in Romanian Identity Building (1831-1878)], Iași, Editura A, 1999.
- Murgescu Mirela L., "'Fatherland' and 'Nation' for Schoolchildren Textbooks and the Concept of Nationhood in Romanian Schools", in I. Vainovski-Mihai (ed.), *Nation and National Ideology: Past, Present and Prospects*. Bucharest: New College Europe, 2001, pp. 266-287. Available at: <http://www.nec.ro/fundatia/nec/publications/nation.pdf> [Accessed 16 March 2012].
- Müller Dietmar, "Conceptul de proprietate în istoria economico-juridică românească" [The Concept of Property in the Romanian Economic-Juridical History], in V. Neumann, A. Heinen (eds.), *Istoria României prin concepte: perspective alternative asupra limbajelor social-politice* [History of Romania in Concepts: Alternative Perspectives Concerning Socio-Political Language], Iași and Bucharest: Polirom, 2010, pp. 201-238.
- Neumann Victor, "Neam și popor: noțiunile etnocentrismului românesc" [Kin and People: Notions of Romanian Ethnocentrism], in V. Neumann, A. Heinen (eds.), *Istoria României prin concepte: perspective alternative asupra limbajelor social-politice* [History of Romania in Concepts: Alternative Perspectives Concerning Socio-Political Language], Iași and Bucharest: Polirom, 2010, pp. 379-400.
- Newall Venetia, "The Destruction of the Hungarian Villages in Romania", *Anthropology Today* 4(5), 1988, pp. 3-5.
- Odysseos Luiza, *The Subject of Coexistence: Otherness in International Relations*, Minneapolis and London, University of Minnesota Press, 2007.
- Odysseos Luiza, "Method and Possibility in Martin Heidegger's Hermeneutics of Facticity", in C. Moore, C. Farrands (eds.), *International Relations Theory and Philosophy: Interpretive Dialogues*, London and New York, Routledge, 2010, pp. 20-32.
- Ornea Zigu, *Anii treizeci: extrema dreaptă românească* [The Thirties: the Romanian Extreme Right], Bucharest, Editura Fundației Culturale Române, 1995.
- Panayi Panikos, *An Ethnic History of Europe Since 1945: Nations, States and Minorities*. Harlow, Longman, 2000.
- Papu Edgar, *Protocronism românesc* [Romanian protochronism]. *Secolul XX*, 5-6, 1974, pp. 8-11.
- Papu Edgar, *Din clasicii noștri: contribuții la ideea unui protocronism românesc* [From our Classics: Contributions to the Idea of a Romanian Protochronism], Bucharest, Eminescu, 1977.
- Petrescu Dragoș, "Communist Legacies in the 'New Europe': History, Ethnicity, and the Creation of a 'Socialist' Nation in Romania", in K. H. Jarausch, T. Lindenberger (eds.), *Conflicted Memories: Europeanizing Contemporary Histories*, New York, Berghahn, 2007, pp. 37-54.
- Petrescu Dragoș, "Building the Nation, Instrumentalizing Nationalism: Revisiting Romanian National-Communism, 1956-1989", *Nationalities Papers*, 37(4): 2009, pp. 523-544.
- Petrescu Dragoș, *Explaining the Romanian Revolution of 1989*, Bucharest, Editura Enciclopedică, 2010.
- Phillips Anne, *The Politics of Presence*, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.
- Popescu-Băjenaru Ion, *Povestea neamului românesc și cartea marilor români* [The Story of Romanian Brethren and the Book of Great Romanians], Bucharest: Cartea Românească, 1925.
- Quinney Anne, "Cultural Colonies: France and the Romanian Imagination", *Contemporary French and Francophone Studies*, 11(3): 2007, pp. 445-452.
- Ram Melanie H., "Romania: from Laggard to Leader?", in: B. Rechel (ed.), *Minority Rights in Central and Eastern Europe*, New York: Routledge, 2009, pp. 180-194.
- Rancière Jacques, *Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy*, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1999.
- Rogobete Silviu E., "Morality and Tradition in Postcommunist Orthodox Lands: on the Universality of Human Rights, with Special Reference to Romania", *Religion, State & Society*, 32(3): 2004, pp. 275-823.

- Roller Mihai, *Istoria R.P.R. [History of the Popular Republic of Romania]*, Bucharest, Editura de Stat Didactică și Pedagogică, 1952.
- Romanian Constitution 1866* [online], Available in Romanian at: <http://www.constitutia.ro/const1923.htm>.
- Romanian Constitution 1923* [online], Available in Romanian at: <http://www.constitutia.ro/const1923.htm>.
- Romanian Constitution 1948* [online], Available in Romanian at: <http://www.constitutia.ro/const1948.htm>.
- Romanian Constitution 1952* [online], Available in Romanian at: <http://www.constitutia.ro/const1952.htm>.
- Romanian Constitution 1965* [online], Available in Romanian at: <http://www.constitutia.ro/const1965.htm>.
- Romanian Government 1993, *Order No. 137/1993* [online], Available at: http://www.minelres.lv/NationalLegislation/Romania/Romania_MinorCouncil_English.htm.
- Romanian Parliament 1991, *Constitution of Romania 1991* [online], Available at: <http://www.cdep.ro/pls/dic/site.page?id=371>.
- Romocea Cristian G., "Reconciliation in the Ethnic Conflict in Transylvania: Theological, Political and Social Aspects", *Religion, State & Society*, 32(2): 2004, pp. 159-176.
- Ronnas, "Per Turning the Romanian Peasant into a New Socialist Man: an Assessment of Rural Development Policy in Romania", *Soviet Studies*, 41(4): 1989, pp. 543-559.
- Sasse Gwendolyn, "Securitization or Securing Rights? Exploring the Conceptual Foundations of Policies towards Minorities and Migrants in Europe", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 43(4): 2005, pp. 673-693.
- Securitate Directive, 1951, *Directivă referitoare la organizarea evidenței operative a elementelor dușmănoase din Republica Populară Română* [Directive Concerning the Activity of Inimical Elements in the Romanian People's Republic], Available at: http://cnsas.ro/ist_sec.html [Accessed 16 March 2012].
- Smith Anthony D., *Myths and Memories of the Nation*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.
- Smith Anthony D., *The Nation in History: Historiographical Debates about Ethnicity and Nationalism*, Cambridge and Oxford, Polity Press, 2000.
- Solonari Vladimir, "'Model Province': Explaining the Holocaust of Bessarabian and Bukovinian Jewry", *Nationalities Papers*, 34(4): 2006, pp. 471-500.
- Somers Margaret R., "Citizenship and the Place of the Public Sphere: Law, Community and Political Culture in the Transition to Democracy", *American Sociological Review*, 58(5): 1993, pp. 587-620.
- Spiridon Monica, "Identity Discourses on Borders in Eastern Europe", *Comparative Literature*, 58(4): 2006, pp. 376-386.
- Spiridon Monica, "Language and the Symbolic Engineering of the European Self", *European Review*, 17(1): 2009, pp. 149-159.
- Stan Lavinia, Lucian Turcescu, *Religion and Politics in Post-Communist Romania*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.
- Tănăsioiu Cosmina, "Post-Communist Political Symbolism: New Myths – Same Old Stories? An Analysis of Romanian Political Mythology", *Romanian Journal of Political Science*, 5(1): 2005, pp. 111-128.
- Tănăsioiu Cosmina, "Intellectuals and Post-Communist Politics in Romania: an Analysis of Public Discourse, 1990-2000", *East European Politics and Societies*, 22(1): 2008, pp. 80-113.
- Teschke Benno, *The Myth of 1648: Class, Geopolitics and the Making of Modern International Relations*, London, Verso, 2003.
- Tismăneanu Vladimir, *Stalinism pentru eternitate: o istorie politică a comunismului românesc* [Stalinism for Eternity: a Political History of Romanian Communism], Bucharest and Iași, Polirom, 2005.

- Troie Sergiu Z., "The Hungarian Status Law in Romania: Anatomy of an Inter-National Dispute", *Slovo*, 16(1): 2004, pp. 35-55.
- Turda Marius, "The Nation as Object: Race, Blood and Biopolitics in Interwar Romania", *Slavic Review*, 66(3): 2007, pp. 413-441.
- Turnock David, "The Planning of Rural Settlement in Romania", *The Geographical Journal*, 157(3): 1991, pp. 251-264.
- Țărău Virgiliu, "Considerații cu privire la evoluția compoziției etnice a Partidului Comunist Român în unele județe din Transilvania, 1944-1947" [Considerations Concerning the Evolution of Ethnic Composition of the Romanian Communist Party in Some Counties in Transylvania, 1944-1947], in M. Anton, F. Anghel, C. Popa (eds.), *Hegemoniile trecutului: evoluții românești și europene* [Hegemonies of the Past: Romanian and European Evolutions], Bucharest: Curtea Veche Publishing, 2006, pp. 307-325.
- Ungureanu Camil, "Derrida on Free Decision: between Habermas' Discursivism and Schmitt's Decisionism", *Journal of Political Philosophy*, 16(3): 2008, pp. 293-325.
- UDMR (2008), *Uniunea Democrată a Maghiarilor din România* [The Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania] [online], UDMR. Available at: <http://www.udmr.ro/aboutus.php> [Accessed 21 January 2011].
- Verdery Katherine, *National Ideology under Socialism: Identity and Cultural Politics in Ceaușescu's Romania*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991.
- Wæver Ole, "Securitisation and Desecuritisation", in R Lipschutz (ed.), *On Security*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1995, pp. 46-86.
- Weber Eugen, *Peasants into Frenchmen: the Modernization of Rural France, 1870-1914*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1976.
- Weber Renate, "The Protection of National Minorities in Romania: a Matter of Political Will and Wisdom", in J. Kranz, H. Kupper (eds.), *Law and Practice of Central European Countries in the Field of National Minorities Protection after 1989*, Warsaw: Centre for International Relations, 1998, pp. 147-205. Available at: http://csm.org.pl/fileadmin/files/Biblioteka_CSM/Ksiazki/1998/National%20Minorities%20Law%20and%20Practice%201998%20CSM.pdf. [Accessed 3 February 2011].
- Wendt Alexander, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: the Social Construction of Power Politics", *International Organization*, 46(2): 1992, pp. 391-425.
- Wolff Robert L., "Romania: the Latin Empire of Constantinople", *Speculum*, 23(1): 1948, pp. 1-34.